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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between various forms of social deviance and the 
economic structure of society is a topic which has preoccupied social 
scientists, criminologists and historians as far back as the early 
nineteenth century (Veld, 1958). The early studies were essentially 
descriptive with little emphasis placed on complicated statistical 
~echniques. It was nut until the twentieth century that more advanced 
statistical methods were applied to this issue. 
The application of "modern" statistical procedures to the study 
of suicide, crime and economic conditions did little to clarify the 
relationship between these variables. Some studies indicated a 
positive relationship between crime and the economy while others have 
found inverse relationships. In addition, as we shall see, the rela-
tionships between these variables have differed based on the particu-
lar historical time-span studied. 
While these differences would leave open the strong possibility 
of anomie social change being a major independent variable effecting 
crime, this Durkheimian proposition has yet to be empirically tested 
in a direct manner. To complicate matters, contemporary developments 
in econometric time-series statistics have cast serious doubts upon 
the validity of the coefficients obtained in previous studies. Thus, 
with the possible exception of suicide studies, the relationships 
between serious crime and economic conditions have yet to be 
determined. 
1 
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For purposes of this study, the literature review will be divided 
into three sections each dealing with a different aspect of the rela-
tionships between these variables. The sections are (1) homicide, 
crime and the economy, (2) suicide and the economy, and (3) homicide 
and suicide. A statement of the-problem will follow with a descrip-
tion of the proposed methodology being provided. 
Homicide, Crime and the Economy 
Attempts to analyze the relationship between homicide, ~~her 
crimes and economic conditions have a long historical tradition within 
the social sciences. In one manner or another, various researchers 
have tackled this issue from as early as 1829 (Sellin, 1937). 
Rather than review all of the earlier studies which have been 
conducted on this topic, the readers are referred to the excellent and 
exhaustive reviews provided by Thomas (1927), Sellin (1937), and Vold 
(1958). However, certain studies, due to the quality of their 
research and influence on the field, do warrant a presentation. 
The first empirical attempt to study the relations between crime 
and economic change was published by Davies (1922), who correlated 
. . 
u.s. wholesale prices as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
with annual admissions to the stste prisons of New York for the years 
1886-1915. His findings yielded a correlation coefficient of 
-.41+.13. In the same year, Ogburn and Thomas (1922) created a 
composite index of u.s. economic conditions covering the years 1870 
to 1920 and found that convictions for criminal offenses (all) in 
New York State increased during business depression (r=.35~.08). 
However, it was also found that convictions for crimes against the 
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person only correlated -.12+.09 for the same period. Their conclu-
sions are that despite the various inadequacies found in crime sta-
tistics, the relationship between crime and economic conditions is 
negative. In a sequel to the paper with Ogburn, Dorothy Thomas (1927) 
sought to examine the relation between a composite business index for 
1852-1913 and prosecutions for various crimes in Great Britain. 
Thomas utilized a bivariate times-series analysis with the secular 
trend eliminated from the data. Her correlations were -.25+.13 for all 
prosecutions (1857-1913), -.25+.13 for prosecutions of crimes against 
property without violence (1857-1913), +.06+.13 for crimes of violence 
against the person (1857-1913), and +05+.13 for prosecutions for 
crimes against morals (1857-1913). The author's conclusions were that 
although it appeared that crimes against property were negatively 
related to economic conditions and crimes of violence against the 
person were positively related to the same conditions, the correla-
tion coefficients were not sufficiently large enough to warrant any 
real conclusions regarding the true nature of the relationships 
between the variables involved. 
Phelps (1929) conducted a study of cycles of crime in Providence 
and Bristol Counties, Rhode Island for the years 1889-1926. The 
number of persons indicted for various crimes was used as the crime 
index. The economic index utilized was the amount of relief fur-
nished by the Department of Public Aid. A rise in relief rates would 
indicate hard economic times with high positive correlations point-
ing to a significant relationship between the variables. The find-
ings were as follows: (a) Total offenses. A positive .41 correlation 
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was found between total offenses and poverty relief; (b) Crimes against 
the person. A positive but insignificant +.16 correlation was found 
between crimes of physical violence and poverty; (c) Crimes against 
property. The coefficient was +.36 for crimes against property and 
poverty; (d) Crimes against sex morality and public order. A coeffi-
cient of +.25 was obtained between poverty relief and crimes against 
sex morality and public order. Again it appeared that crimes against 
property were more closely related to economic fluctuations than did 
violent crimes against the person and crimes against morality. 
Winslow ll931) in a study sponsored by the National Commission on 
Law Observance and Enforcement, compared manufacturing unemployment 
rates for Massachusetts with two series of crime statistics--the 
number of admissions to criminal institutions and to probation and the 
number of prosecutions begun in lower courts. The years covered were 
1883-1926. No comparisons were made between economic rates and 
murder and manslaughter. Her findings were that unemployment tended 
to coincide with increases in (a) assault crimes, (b) trespassing 
crimes, (c) family crimes (neglect of family, abuse, bastardy, etc.) 
and, to a lesser degree, (d) offenses against chastity. The findings 
tend to coneradict.those presented above. 
Vold (1935) was particularly interested in the fluctuation of 
crime rates during the early and most severe time of the Depression 
(1929-1934) • His dependent variables were the commitment rates to 
state and federal penal institutions and the rates of known ~imes 
reported to police in 71 cities with more than 100,000 population. 
His findings, briefly stated, were that while overall crimes gradu-
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ally increased up to 1932 they very quickly declined after that. His 
conclusions were that "there has been no increase in crime at all com-
mensurate with the extent or duration of the Depression" {p. 803). 
Hence, he found no overall relationship between crime and the economy 
for the time period cqvered. 
Wagner {1936) compared arrests for murder, manslaughter, aggra-
vated assault, larceny, burglary and robbery in Philadelphia with wage 
payments, retail trade and the cose of living as prepared by the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistics. Crimes against the person corre-
lated +.54 with the cost of living, +.54 with age payments and +.62 • 
with retail trade. The coefficients for arrests for crimes against 
property were practically zero, although the respective coefficients 
for burglary were -.92, and -.95. 
Maller {1936) studied juvenile delinquency in New York City with 
emphasis on the effects of the Depression. The data utilized covered 
1925-1934. The measure of delinquency were the arraignments for 
offenses reported in Children's Court. His findings were that 
delinquency increased to a peak in 1930-1931 with a decrease in the 
following year--1932-1933 which was, incidentally, the year of the 
highest unemployment in the recorded history of the United States 
{24.9). His conclusion was that for the most part, the Depression 
tended to inhibit delinquent behavior due to an increase in social 
service organizations • Similar findings were reported by the Lynds 
{1937) in their study of Middletown and by Sanders and Exell {1937) • 
Wiers (1945) correlated delinquency rates {based on court hear-
ings--1921-1943) with non-agricultural employment {r = .71), depart-
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ment store sales (r = .66), gross national product (r = .72), and 
industrial production (r = .72). What is unique to his particular 
study is Wier's inclusion· of social indices relating to urgan-rural 
differentiation. Percentage of farm families, percentage of farm 
workers and percentage of rural population over the total population 
correlated -.83, -.86, and -.83 respectively with his delinquency 
rates. Finally, and most interestingly enough, the percentage of the 
population aged 7 to 17 as a percent of the total population corre-
lated -.66 with delinquency. The implications of this study were that 
not only was delinquency~ related to economic decline, but it was 
positively related to urbanization and negatively related to the per-
centage of youth in the population. Similar findings regarding the 
positive relationship between juvenile delinquency and economic condi-
tions were found by Bogen (1944) in his study of Los Angeles. 
Glaser and Rice (1959) correlated time-series data (1930-1956) 
on various crime arrest rates and unemployment among males in various 
age categories. Their data included national arrest rates (United 
States) and specific rates for Boston, Chicago and Cincinnati. The 
findings indicated that whether the relationship was positive or 
negative depended upon the age category of the arrestees, i.e., there 
was an inverse relationship between juvenile crime and unemployment 
and a positive~elationship between adult crimes and unemployment. 
Interestingly enough, the only exception to these findings occurred 
with the Chicago data where no relationships were found. The authors 
attribute the discrepancies with the Chicago findings as being due to 
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statistical and criminal justice procedures between the urban munici-
palities. 
Lunden (1968) analyzed court commitments to prisons in nine states 
(1930-1962) with United States unemployment rates for the same period. 
While utilizing an impressionistic approach to the analysis of his data, 
Lunden's conclusions were that while there appeared to be a relatively 
strong positive relationship between unemployment and court commitments 
during the Depression (1930-1941), the trend seemed to reverse itself 
in the post-Second World War years so that unemployment was either 
negatively (slightly) or not at all related to court commitments. In 
a comparison with a sample of European, Asian and African societies 
during the post-war years, Lunden found that the general trend was for 
a steady increase in crime rates over time. Given the consistency of 
this finding for both other societies and our own, Lunden concluded 
that the rapid and radical social changes which have been taking place 
in both Western and non-Western societies since the Second World War 
were probably more closely related to increasing crime than are eco-
nomic conditions ~er se. 
Bourdouris (1971) analyzed 6389 homicides occuring in Detroit 
during 1926-1968. Although economic conditions were included as vari-
ables, the primary emphasis was on the interactions between family 
members preceding familial homicides. Bourdouris utilized the 
Michigan Personal Income index as an indicator of economic conditions 
and correlated it with the annual proportion of all homicides involv-
ing family relations. He found a synchronous time correlation of +.45 
(p .001) between the MPI and familial homicide. This contradicted 
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Boudouris' assumption that there would be a negative relationship 
between economic conditions and familial homicide. As a possible 
explanation Boudouris proposes that those involved in familial homicide 
may be of an ambiguous social status and do not enjoy the rewards of a 
prosperous economy and therefore "feel no incentive to adhere to the 
norms of society, and are likelier to engage in criminal and violent 
behavior" (p. 675}. 
Allison (1972} investigated unemployment rates as one of 14 vari-
ables in a regression analysis of crime rates and socio-economic vari-
ables. The other socioeconomic variables which he included were such 
factors as relative stability of population, density of the popula-
tion, strength of the police force, mean number of years of education 
etc. The data utilized was for the Chicago SMSA. Unemployment 
alone accounted for 57 percent of the variances in the crime rate and 
had a significant T values of 3.78. The second variable of importance 
in the equation was the proportion of males to females in the popula-
tion. This expl~ined an additional 10 percent of the variance. The 
implications of his study are that where one finds both high male 
unemployment and a larger proportion of males to females one will also 
find high crime rates. 
Spector (1975} was concerned with the relationship between popu-
lation density, unemployment and violent crime in 103 SMSAs with 
populations over 100,000. He utilized a multiple-regression analysis 
on various measures of population density and unemployment. His find-
ings indicated that there were no significant relationships between 
violent crimes, unemployment and population density for these SMSAs. 
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Rather, he found a strong positive relationship between city size and 
fiolence and area of the country and violence (p. 401). Hs concl~sions 
were that "it is the specific characteristics of large cities vis-a-vis 
smaller cities that contain the causes of violence" (p. 401). 
Ehrlich (1973) attempted to develop an econometric model of 
criminal activity. National rates of known crimes (across all cate-
gories) were the dependent variables. His model is essentially a 
utilitarian one in that crime becomes a function of the amount of pay-
offs derived from such activity balanced against payoffs derived from 
legitimate activities with the community. In.addition, both the 
probability and severity of punishment must be included in the equa-
tion as "costs" for the participation in the illegal activities. Crime 
will increase if there is a decrease in legitimate economic opportuni-
ties available coupled with a low estimate of the probability of appre-
hension and punishment by imprisonment (p. 545). This is especially 
relevant for crimes against property (robbery, burglary, larceny, and 
auto theft) but negligible for crimes against the person. Thus, 
according to Ehrlich's model, crime against property should increase 
during economic depressions if there also exist the subjective esti-
mate that the probability of apprehension and punishment are low. 
(For an interesting discussion on the controversey surrounding 
Ehrlich's theoretical perspective see McGahey, 1980). 
Flange and Sherbenou (1976) in a similar but more extensive study 
looked at the relationships between crime, poverty and what they 
termed factors of urbanization for 840 American cities. While their 
findings indicated that poverty and urbanization explained 25 percent 
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of the variance for violent crimes for all of their cities combined, 
when broken down geographically, poverty had little or no explanatory 
power for the Southern cities in their sample. Their hypothetical 
rationale for this finding was that the South was not subject to the 
"culture of poverty" usually associated with lower income in the North 
(p. 343). Although the authors acknowledged that crimes of violence 
are more prevalent in the South than elsewhere in the nation (p. 340) 
their explanation for their findings implies (without their explicitly 
stating it) a "culture of violence" concept. 
A recent study by Brenner (1976) is directly related to our pre-
sent research. Given the nature of Brenner's findings and their 
relationship to our own (see below), it would be advantageous to sum-
marize his research in greater detail. 
Brenner begins py accepting the basic sociological notion that 
traditional societal bonds relating to primary groups gradually lose 
their importance as society tends to industrialize and urbanize. 
This, according to Brenner, includes a shift in societal values 
regarding the prerequisites for social status, i.e., there is a move-
ment from ascribed status to achieved status. Achieved status is 
primarily attained through economic achievement since the societal 
power base is now invested in the national political economy with the 
result being that "there is a gradual increase in the degree to which 
social integration is dependent on the economic functions of society" 
(p. 555). Concornmitant with the above view, erenner also stresses 
the problems of urbanization, especially in regards to the hetero-
geneity of the urban population and the diverse cultural norms and 
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values which such a situation engenders. This leads to what Brenner 
calls a state of "moral relativism" (equivalent to Durk.heim's concept 
of anomie). Coupling moral relativism with the psychological stress of 
economic change can lead to violence and utilitarian crime. 
Given this perspective Brenner utilized a variety of time-series 
techniques (~ including first-differences) to examine the relation-
ships between economic change and homicide rates in England, Scotland, 
canada and the United States. His economic independent variables were 
the Gross National Product (GNP), unemployment, income and inflation 
(measured by the Consumer Price Index) • Brenner found two interesting 
findings: (1) there is a persistently positive long-term relationship 
between economic growth an~ rising homicide rates and (2) there is a 
strong positive relationship between radical declines in the economy 
(short-term} and increasing homicide rates. While these two findings 
appaar contradictory, Brenner attempts to reconcile them by referring 
to Henry and Short's study. Henry and Short found a positive relation-
ship between economic growth and homicide attributing this to the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis and the notion of relative depriva-
tion. While Brenner partially accepts the Henry and Short hypotheses, 
he faults their methodology in that they failed to analyse their coef-
ficients specifically during the period of the Great Depression. Using 
only the years 1929-1936, Brenner found a drastic reversal of the long-
term positive relationship between economic growth and homicides which 
directly contradicts the Henry and Short findings (Brenner, op. cit., 
p. 569) • Brenner attempts to explain these discrepancies in findings 
by postulating two basic subpopulations which might contribute to the 
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homicide findings. The first group correspond to those experiencing 
relative deprivation, i.e., they find their own economic condition 
deteriorating or stagnating while other groups are experiencing 
increasing prosperity. The second group invo-lves those individuals who 
experience "absolute economic loss" during period of economic down-
turns of great intensity. 
Suicide and Economic Conditions 
While there have been somewhat fewer studies correlating suicides 
with economic conditions, the findings have been more consistent than 
those found in homicide and other crimes studies. As early as 1822 
Falret contended that suicide rates varied with economic conditions and 
social change. In addition, he also observed that suicide rates were 
positively related to one's social class position. 
While Durkheim (1951) was not specifically interested in the 
relationship between economic conditions and social suicide rates, his 
work did touch on the issue. Durkheim's major hypothesis was that 
suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social 
groups of which the individual forms a part (p. 209). Hence,· suicides 
are the result of social causes and not individual causes. 
As part of his analysis, Durkheim developed four basic categories 
of suicide--the egoistic, the altruistic, the anomie, and the fatal-
istic. Egoistic suicide was the result of excessive individualism, 
that is, the individual ego transcends the group with the result that 
the individual is only concerned with his/her own interests. Altru-
istic suicide was a result of inadequate individuation. That is, while 
egoistic suicide may have no meaning for life, the altruistic suicide 
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will find his/her rationale in some circumstance or belief beyond human 
existence. Those who engaged in altruistic suicide generally did.so 
for the sake of the group, e.g., Japanese Kamikazi pilots during World 
war II. Anomie suicides were the result of a state of anomie or 
relative "normlessness." Anomie, according to Durkheim, occurs when 
there is a period of both rapid and radical social change. such 
changes disrupt the equilibrium of the social order by upsetting the 
prescribed norms regulating means and ends. For Ourkheim, anomie 
suicie was and is a product of urban industrial societies. The social 
change most conducive to the development of anomie is essentially 
economic change--whether it be in the direction of poverty or pros-
perity. In terms of social class, Durkheim felt that employers and 
managers would exhibit greater rates of anomie suicide than would 
workers. Urban society would have higher suicide rates than agrarian 
societies since the former display greater ·levels of normlessness. 
Finally, Dur~ehim developed the category of fatalistic suicide 
which was meant to be the opposite of anomie suicide. Fatalistic sui-
cide resulted from excessive regulation. That is, a situation whereby 
the individual's future is viewed as being so appressively bleak that 
suicide is preferred to a continued existence under those circumstances. 
ourkehim felt that such suicide is rare in contemporary society. 
Halbwachs (1930) in a replication of Dur~m's work, confirmed 
the relationship between fluctuations in the business index and sui-
cide in Germany from 1880 to 1914. For Halbwachs suicide rates were 
consistently high during all levels of economic prosperity--a point 
which Durkheim emphasized. 
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Thomas and Ogburn (1922) correlated the suicide rate for 100 u. s. 
cities for 1900-1920 with cycles of business conditions and found a 
correlation -.74+.07. In a later study, Thomas (1927) correlated 
British suicide rates with a composite economic index for the years 
1858-1913. Her correlation coefficient as -.50+.10 for the relation-
ship between these variables. 
Hurlburt (1932) analyzed the relationship between various economic 
indices (The American Telephone and Teletype Index and the Babson Index 
of Economic Productivity) with both the census rate of urban suicides 
and the suicide rates calculated by the Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company. His analysis was for the years 1902-1925. Hurlburt found 
that suicide declined in years of prosperity and advanced in years of 
depression with its greatest increases in years of acut economic 
destress (1907, 1908, and 1921). Suicide's greatest decreases were 
during the period of greatest prosperity between 1961 and 1920. 
Dublin and Bunzel (1932) analyzed suicide both in terms of socio-
economic class and economic conditions. In terms of social class 
distribution {based on occupation), the authors found the highest 
suicide rates among the age 16-45 years old unemployed category. The 
next highest suicide group was found among those classified as being in 
Class !--"professionals and highest ranks of business" (p. 94). 
In terms of economic trends and suicide, Dublin and Bunzel cor-
related the suicide rates for New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania 
{1910-1931) with an unspecified index of economic activity and 
obtained a coefficient of -.55+.15 for annual data. This relation-
ship was more prominent among white males than among white females 
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(-.51~.16 to -.32~.20). This high negative correlation was less pro-
nounced for wage earners than for the general population as a whole. 
In a later study (1963) Dublin compared the gross national product 
with suicide rates for 1910 to 1960. Again suicide was negatively cor-
related with economic rates. As Dublin puts it, "Periods of decreasing 
business activity and rising unemployment usually are also periods of 
higher suicide rates. However, a business crisis is not always fol-
lowed by a rise in the suicide rate and the severity of the crisis is 
no measure of the attendant increase in suicide" (p. 66) • 
The post-World War II researches in·suicide tended to ignore--at 
least for the first two post-war decades--time-series studies of 
economics and suicide. Emphasis was placed on either more in-depth 
community studies of suicide or on individual case studies (Douglas, 
1967). The major consensus of tne pre-war time-series researchers was 
that suicide varied inversely with economic conditions. On possible 
effect of negative economic circumstances is a loss of status through 
occupational unemployment. Theoretically, the loss of one's job 
could be a stimulant to suicide. Sainsbury (1955) conducted a study 
of suicide in London and concluded that indigenous poverty per se does 
not stimulate suicide. Rather, suicide is best considered in rela-
tion to a loss of occupational status. This, according to Sainsbury, 
is especially true during periods of economic depression. 
Gibbs and Porterfield (1960) studied 955 suicides recorded in 
New Zealand between 1946 and 1951. Their concern was with the suicide 
subjects' social situation from birth to death. The study involved a 
comparison of the proportion of suicides who had experienced a status-
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loss with the proportion of status-loss found in the general popula-
tion. Status was defined in terms of occupational prestige. Their 
main findings were that both downward and upward mobility were asso-
ciated with significantly more suicide, but that downward mobility 
seemed to be related with a higher suicide rate than upward mobility. 
However, this loss of occupational status is but the first step in a 
process leading to a suicidal demise. Status change leads to a 
"personal crisis." It is this crisis which becomes the precipitating 
event leading to suicide. 
Powell (1958) proposes an additional theory of suicide coming from 
Ourkheirn's tradition. He analyzed all recorded male suicides in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma for the years 1937 to 1956) • This resulted in a total of 426 
suicides over the age of 14. These suicides were then divided into 
various occupational categories based on the occupation held imme-
diately prior to death. His basic findings were that for males, 
suicide predominated in professional, unskilled laborer and retired 
occupational categories. Powell attributes his findings to various 
reactions to social anomie. However, his theory does not really 
indicate that downward or upward mobility are actually responsible for 
suicide among males. He does show that there is an occupational level 
susceptibility to suicide without indicating its relation to social 
change. 
warren Breed (1963) in an intensive study of 105 consecutive 
white male suicides in New Orleans for the -years 1954-1959, found that 
there was a significantly greater degree of downward inter-genera-
tional occupational mobility among suicides prior to their death 
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than was found in a control group. This was found to be the case 
regardless of one's original occupational category (e.g., professional, 
managerial, unskilled labor, etc.). 
Maris (1967) studied all of the recorded suicides for Chicago-
Cook County for 1959 to 1963. His basic proposition was that high 
status categories doe not have the highest suicide rates and that 
status change is a greater stimulant of suicide than is status position. 
His findings, consistent with others mentioned above, indicated that 
suicide varied inversely with the social status hierarchy. However, 
Maris did not statistically show that status change was related to the 
data findings. His basis for implicating status change comes from a 
review of the above described hypotheses made by Sainsbury, Powell, 
and Breed. 
Rushing (1968) analysed the relationship between income, unemploy-
ment, occupation and suicide. His findings were that suicide was 
positively related to unemployment in the lower income levels. How-
ever, unemployment was found to be "negatively related to suicide at 
high income levels and positively related to suicide (in high income 
levels) under conditions of lower unemployment" (pp. 502-03) .The impli-
cations are that for the lower classes (lower occupational categories) 
suicide is positively related to unemployment with the opposite being 
true for the upper occupational categories. Thus, the upper occupa-
tional categories will show increases in suicide during periods of 
economic prosperity and low unemployment. Rushing interprets his 
findings to indicate that anomie may be the major social structural 
variable effecting suicides among the upper-classes while fatalism 
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plays the same role for the lower-classes. 
Vigderhous (1977) in an article meant to describe the forecasting 
applications of the Box-Jenkins technique for social science use, 
applied the technique to u.s. white male suicide rates for the years 
1920-1969. His findings indicated that for white males, unemployment 
appeared to be the most important variable in explaining suicide rates 
over time. Female suicides were more closely related to divorce rates 
over time. In terms of the Box-Jenkins technique as a forecasting 
methodology, Vigderhous reaches the conclusion that "it is difficult 
to generalize the superiority of one forecasting technique over the 
other" (ibid., p. 48). 
Myron Boor (1980) correlated the unemployment rates and suicide 
rates in Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Britain, Japan, Sweden and 
the United States for the years 1962-1976. Despite certain methodo-
logical problems (e.g., if we can only dubiously accept the statistics 
of the United States, what can we assume regarding the comparability 
of statistics from eight different nations?) • Boor found that there 
was a significantly positive statistical relationship between suicide 
and unemployment for four of the eight nations (United States, Canada, 
France and Japan). Findings for Germany, Sweden and Italy were 
statistically insignificant while the finding for Britain was in the 
op29site direction of that predicted (r = 0.59, p~.OS). 
Boor next correlated the annual variations in suicide rates for 
persons in various age and sex categories. According to Boor the 
relationships between the sex categories and suicide rates were 
indistinguishable, i.e., both sexes had similar coefficients. 
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However, with regards to age differences and suicide, Boor found that 
the most significant correlations between suicide and unemployment 
occurred in the younger to middle-age categories (15-24, 25-34, 35-44). 
In Sweden and Italy there were no significant correlations for any age 
category while in Britain suicide and unemployment were significantly 
correlated in a negative direction for all age categories. 
Marshall and Hodge (1981) utilized a time-series technique in 
looking at the relationship between white male suicides and unemploy-
ment for the years 1933 to 1976. The authors began by analyzing 
Pierce's (op. cit) contention that rapid and radical change in the 
economy, regardless of direction, will positively increase suicide 
rates. Their assumption was that Pierce's findings were due to a mis-
specification of the regression model he utilized. Employing a 
different model, Marshall and Hodge found that suicide was positively 
related to unemployment. This was especially true when unemployment 
increased over time. Thus, Pierce's contention that either positive 
or negative changes in the economy would lead to increases in suicide 
was refuted. Only negative changes in the economy were related to 
increasing suicide rates. 
Schapiro and Ahlburg (1982) take the Durkheimian position that 
the disparity between "needs" (socially conditioned expectations) and 
the "means" to satisfy those needs may result in suicidal behavior. 
While other studies, according to the authors, have concerned them-
selves with economic means, their study was meant to concentrate on 
aspirations. The authors develop an econometric model in which 
economic aspirations are tied to the age structure of the labor force 
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and to fluctuations in relative income (defined as the ratio of 
expected income to income aspirations) • These two variables are,· in 
turn, related to individual behavior. Thus, when relative income is 
low "the disparity between means and needs leads to psychological 
stress" (p. 2) and increases in deviant behavior such as suicide and 
homicide. Unemployment results in low relative income especially 
among various cohort groups within the labor force. According to the 
authors, the post-World War II baby boom has resulted in a negative 
effect of the younger cohort sizes on relative earnings and relative 
income. Thus, "while suicide rates for both males and females aged 
15-34 have been increasing, rates for both males and females aged 
35-64, have basically been declining" (p. 3). However, a continued 
recession and high rate of unemployment can reinforce and magnify 
the already high suicide rates for older males (since they came from 
large cohort groups with high needs and expectations). Thus, Schapiro 
and Ahlburg attempt to attribute the differential in suicides among 
various age categories over time as being a function of the size of 
the age cohort, the aspirations resulting from this based upon their 
ability to successfully compete in the labor force and the level of 
national unemployment. 
Suicide and Homicide 
In this section those particular studies which deal specifically 
with both homicide and suicide will be reviewed. Generally, such 
studies have been most b~sically concerned with two issues. First, 
the specific relationship between homicide and suicide as social 
pathologies. Second, the relationship between homicide, suicide, 
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and other socioeconomic variables. 
ourkheim (1951) noted that as early as 1833 Andre-Michael Guerrey 
showed that homicide and suicide varied inversely with one another in 
the French Departments with suicide being high in the North and homi- ~ 
cide being high in the South. As Durkheim further noted, the inverse 
relationship between homicide and suicide was first given theoretical 
significance in the Italian school of criminology--especially in the 
works of Ferri and Morselli. The theoretical position of this school 
was that both homicide and suicide were effects of the same individ~ ,/ 
ualistic cause. Under one set of circumstances an individual will 
commit suicide while under another set of circumstances homicide will 
be the path chosen. The same individual temperament will predispose 
the individual to some type of violent action--either homicide or 
suicide. Which choice the individual accepts, according to these 
theorists, depended upon the norms and values of society regarding / 
which path was most appropriate. 
Durkheim went on to investigate this hypothesis and concluded 
that "suicide sometimes coexists with homicide, sometimes they are 
mutually exclusive; sometimes they react under the same conditions in 
the same way, sometimes in opposite ways, and the antagonistic cases 
are the most numerous" (p. 355). 
Durkhe~'s explanation for this conclusion was that the type of 
relationship found between homicide and suicide depended upon the 
type of suicide which was being compared to the homicide. Thus, ego• 
istic suicide, stemming from an over-individuation, is inversely 
related to homicide. Opposed to this was altruistic suicide which 
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varied positively with homicide. However, Durkheim did not consider 
modern suicides and homicides as having their sources in altruistic 
social conditions and relegated this phenomena to primitive societies. 
The final type of suicide, i.e~, anomie suicide, also varied positively 
with homicide and was most common in modern industrial society (p. 358). 
Durkheim concludes that "certain types of suicide, instead of 
depending on causes opposed to those which occasion homicide, are on 
the contrary expressions of the same social condition and develop in 
~le midst of the same moral environment" (p. 358). Whatever checks 
egoism in society will serve to increase tlle homicide rate while 
whatever checks anomie in society will serve to diminish both homicide 
and suicide. 
Porterfield (1949) found that the u.s. states with low suicide 
rates tended to have high homicide rates, while those states with high 
suicide rates tend toward having low homicide rates. Southern states 
and cities indicated higher rates of homicide than did non-Southern 
states and cities which had high suicide rates. The adjusted corre-
lation between homicide and suicide for all of the states in his 
study was -.35. Porterfield also indicated correlations of +.SO 
between suicide and social well-being, -.75 between homicide and 
alcoholism; what constituted Porterfield's measure of well-being was 
not indicated. Although Porterfield's research indicated regional 
differences in the relationship between homicide and suicide and that 
on a national basis homicide and suicide vary inversely under normal 
circumstances, he also found that homicide and suicide vary posi-
tively during periods of national crisis with the general direction 
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being downward. Hence, according to Porterfield, crises such as war 
and economic depression tend to inhibit both homicide and suicide. 
In a later study, Porterfield (1952) attempted to develop a con-
cept which would explain the ecological relationships which he found 
in his earlier study. His suggestion was that the factor which 
determined the preponderance of either homicide or suicide was the 
degree of secularization within the society. His distinction was 
between "folk" and "secular" societies. Folk society was character-
ized by a high degree of integration with great stress being placed on 
interpersonal ties and the external constraint of behavior. Secular 
society was characterized as involving high degrees of urbanization 
and industrialization, a lack of population indigenousness, a loosen-
ing of community ties and breakdown of mores and norms. His results 
indicated that his suicide was associated with the secular society 
while high crime and homicide rates were related to the "depressed" of 
socially dissatisfied folk societies. 
Straus and Straus (1953) analyzed homicide and suicide rates in 
Ceylon and attempted to formulate a psycho-cultural theory to explain 
the relationship between the two variables and between them and 
society. Suicide and homicide were both viewed as being the result of 
individually experienced frustration. However, in contradiction to 
Durkheim's theory of suicide, homicide and anomie, Straus and Straus 
positively related suicide to a "closely structured" society while 
homicide was inversely related to such a structure and positively 
related to a "loosely structured social system" which was a "culture 
in which considerable variation of individual behavior is sanctioned" 
(p. 468). 
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Wood (1961) also considered homicide and suicide in Ceylon. His 
position was that homicides are related to a low-status, achieved. (not 
ascribed) social position which was undergoing a period of subjective 
status deprivation. These individuals were most frequently alienated, 
demoralized and hostile. In contrast to these individuals, those who 
committed suicide were apt to be of a higher social status and have a 
higher achievement orientation. However, these individuals were sub-
jected to the stress of possible status-loss as well. What seemed to 
determine the choice as to whether one chose suicide or homicide was 
the degree of commitment to one's social status position. 
Quinney (1965) analyzed the homicide and suicide rates for 48 
countries in an attempt to determine what their relationship was to 
economic development. His findings were similar to Porterfield's 
(op. cit., 1952). High homicide rates were related to rural, non-
industrial societies while high suicide rates were found to be related 
to high urbanization and industrialization. If traditional rural 
society is viewed as being more "closely structured" than urban 
industrial society, then it would appear that Quinney's findings are 
the opposite of those presented by Straus and Straus (op. cit., 1953). 
His conclusions were that urbanization resulted in a decrease in 
status integration which, in turn, stimulated an increase in suicide. 
Homicides were related to socioeconomic underdevelopment and a popu-
lation "with a low level of education, lack of sophistication, isola-
tion from heterogeneous values, and a limited frame of reference" 
(p. 405). 
Palmer (1965) investigated a group of nonliterate societies and 
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rated them for the frequency of homicide and suicide. His belief was 
that societies high in one variable would be low in the other vari-
able. Those societies which were "closely structured" and which 
punished crimes severely were thought to have high homicide rates and 
low suicide rates. The findings did not confirm these expectations. 
Instead it appeared that as the severity of punishment increase in the 
various societies, so did both the homicide and suicide rates. 
Lalli and Turner (1968) analyzed 9,709 suicides and 5,183 deaths 
by homicide for white and non-white males ages 20 to 64 according to 
occupational level. Their findings indicated that whites had a higher 
suicide rate than blacks while the reverse was true for homicide. In 
terms of social class (as measured by occupational level) and suicide 
and homicide, the relationships were strongly negative regardless of 
race. For whites, the highest suicide and homicide rates were found 
among laborers and farm workers. For blacks, suicides were more dif-
fusely distributed among various occupational groupings. The highest 
suicide rate was found among agricultural workers with clerical and 
skilled workers and common labor~rs in second place. Black homicides 
were highest among unskilled laborers and agricultural workers. 
The authors interpret these findings in terms of "open" and 
"closed" societies. Blacks had a higher homicide rate due to their 
occupation of a "closed" society which is essentially a tribal or 
caste-like society which emphasizes ascribed status as opposed to 
achieved status. In such a society, a greater reliance is placed on 
primary group relations with few associational ties. The economic 
problems of such societies are quite precarious with the result that 
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manifestations of masculinity become associated with other-directed 
violence. The "open" society has a high suicide rate due to its 
emphasis on impersonal and contractual interpersonal relations. Thus, 
social isolation can only result in self-directed aggression. 
Henry and Short (1954) conducted \'lhat is now a clas.sic study of 
the relationship between homicide, suicide, and economic conditions. 
For Henry and Short, suicide and homicide were acts of aggression 
which found their stimulus in frustration. Whether an individual 
committed an act of homicide or suicide was determined by the degree 
to which the individual was subjected to restraints. Two types of 
restraints were postulated: internal restraints and external res-
traints. Internal restraints were the result of love-oriented tech-
niques of child rearing practices which inculcated a strong superego 
and a tendency to internalize guilt~ Thus, during periods of high 
frustration aggression becomes turned towards the self as opposed to 
becoming other directed. External restraints were the result of 
socialization practices which were primarily punitive. For those 
individuals subjected to external restraints aggression becomes other 
directed, i.e., assaultive or homicidal in nature. 
As mentioned, aggression was more or less a function of frus-
tration, which for Henry and Short, was measured by the fluctuations 
of the economic business cycles. in the United States. It was hypothe-
sized that "high status" individuals (males, whites, aged 25-34, 
Army officers, singles) would be internally restrained and less pre-
disposed toward more assaultive and homicidal expressions of aggres-
sion. 
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Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of my proposed research is to both replicate and 
expand upon the work of Henry and Short. To reiterate, Henry and 
short attempted to correlate (in a time-series model) national 
economic conditions, as measured by the Ayres Index of Industrial 
Productivity, with suicide, homicide and other crime rates. They 
predicted that (1) suicide was negatively related to economic trends, 
and (2) homicide and crime rates were positively related to economic 
trends. Their first prediction was supported by the data. However, 
their second prediction was not generally supported in that while 
homicide was negatively correlated with economic conditions for whites, 
the inverse was true for blacks. 
Henry and Short also attempted indirectly to test Durkheim's 
proposition that prosperity can as easily result in anomie suicide as 
does economic depression. The authors felt that a straightfo~~ard 
counting and comparison of years for economic conditions and suicide 
rates would adequately test this proposition. That is, those years 
in which there was an increase in the economy were counted and com-
pared with the suicide rates for the synchronous period. 
A similar technique was used for those years in which the 
economy was declining. Their findings were that suicide increased 
during 80 percent of the years in which the economy was declining and 
that regarding prosperity, there was only a minimal positive rela-
tionship between suicide and "those years when the rise in the 
business index was very slightly but not during those years of abrupt 
growth of power and wealth" (Henry and Short, p. 27). 
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It was further postulated that (1) suicide rates would rise 
during economic depressions and decline during periods of economic 
prosperity while personal injury crimes would rise during economic 
prosperity and decline during business depression, and (2) the 
correlation between suicide and economic conditions would be higher 
for high status groups than for low status groups while the correla-
tion between homicide and economic conditions would be higher for low 
status groups than for high status groups. 
Henry and Short utilized the Burns-Mitchell time-series tech-
nique in their analysis of economic conditions, homicide and suicide~ 
The ~conomic index used was the Ayers' Index of Industrial Productivity 
which is a secular trend removed indicator. The crime and suicide 
rates used were bo~~ national, regional and local and generally covered 
the years 1900-1947 (not all variables covered the same time period). 
Best fitting lines were applied to each regression equation and correla-
tion coefficients were calculated between economic conditions and crime 
and suicide rates (controlling for the var~ous age, sex, and race 
categories). 
The suicide rates for white males (high status) was found to be 
more sensitive to business fluctuations than the rates of non-whites 
and white females (low status). All of the correlations between sui-
cide rates and business conditions (regardless of race, sex or age 
category) were highly negative. Homicide rates for whites correlated 
negatively with business conditions while for blacks the correlation 
was positive. No homicide correlations were made controlling for age 
or sex. 
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Henry and Short's postulated second point (cited above) was 
confirmed in that the correlation coefficient between suicide and the 
economy was higher for whites (-,81) than for blacks (-,38). However, 
the blacks' homicide and economy correlation was not higher than that 
of whites, The correlation between homicide and economic prosperity 
was strongly negative for whites {-,80) and positive for blacks 
(+.26). This finding partially contradicted point two which pre-
dicted a higher positive relationship between homicide and prosperity 
for low status groups with regards to suicide. Henry and Short's 
overall findings were that therewas a strong negative relationship 
between suicide and economic prosperity regardless whether one con-
trolled for sex, race or age, Finally, in terms of crimes against 
property and the business cycle, burglary correlated, -,74 (1929-1941) 
and robbery correlated ~.65 (1929-1941) with economic conditions. 
David Lester (1971) in a small but scathing study investigated 
the correlational relationships between suicide and homicide over time, 
locale and various status categories. The resulting correlations 
differed greatly for each of the three methods of correlation. For 
instance, over time (1950-1964) homicide correlated positively with 
suicide (.62). Correlated over states and over status categories, the 
coefficient relationships for the two variables were zero. It was 
concluded by the author that no available theory was able to explain 
the complex pattern of correlations found and that more individualized 
social-psychological studies were needed to truly explain the rela-
tionships between these two variables. 
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In addition, this minor increase in suicide rates during years 
of slight economic growth existed only for females and not for males 
who are considered as being more involved in and susceptible to the 
influences of economic fluctuations. Thus, Henry and Short felt that 
these results failed to substantiate Durkheim's proposition that 
abrupt increases in prosperity lead to concomitant increases in 
anomie suicide. (Henry and Short, 1954: pp. 27, 42). Although it is 
considered as being the most comprehensive study of its type, time 
has made obvious certain inadequacies which make a replication and 
expansion both valuable and desired. 
First, while admittedly advanced for its time period, there are 
certain methodological inadequacies in the Henry and Short work which 
casts a degree of doubt upon their results. 
Pierce (1967), in a very limited, but interesting replication of 
Henry and Short's study observed that the researchers failed to con-
sider the possibility of autocorrelations influencing their correla-
tions. The presence of such autocorrelation can result in speciously 
high correlation coefficients. In order to test this point, Pierce 
applied the Durbin-Watson "d" statistic to some of Henry and Short's 
data. This statistic allows a researcher to determine if such auto-
correlation is present. The d-statistic attained indicated that there 
was a high degree of autocorrelation in Henry and Short's findings 
rendering them inconclusive since the "true" correlations are not 
known. Pierce felt that the autocorrelation was due to the inherent 
nature of the Ayres' Index and went on to construct an index which 
would reflect, what he called, "the subjective definition of the 
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economy by the general public," as opposed to an objective index. 
This "subjective" index was the absolute values of the first differ-
ences of the index of common stock prices as correlated by a one year 
lead with the deviant behavior being studied, This technique resulted 
in an acceptable d-statistic and a high positive correlation between 
stock prices and suicide indicating a direct contradiction with Henry 
and Short's findings. 
An additional point which Pierce makes is that Henry and Short 
failed to adequately test Durkheim's contention regarding the influ-
ence of anomie on suicide. If anomie is a result of a both rapid and 
radical degree of socioeconomic change (Durkheim, 1951: pp. 241-243, 
247), regardless of the direction of the economic change, then the 
correlation of absolute rate levels or the counting and comparison of 
rates within years will not truly address itself to the problem. 
Instead, Pierce suggests that the first-differences between years 
should be utilized as the indicator of change. Hence, an important 
point was made in that suicide, homicide, and other crimes were never 
really studied in terms of radical social change and its effect on 
social disorganization. ~fuile Porterfield (1952), Quinney (1965), 
Wood (1961), and Straus and Straus (1953) all postulate a differential 
susceptibility to either homicide or suicide, based upon the level of 
modernity and social organization of a society, no one has yet 
empirically tested the relationship of rapid social change to homicide 
and suicide within a single society. 
A second point to be made is that although published in 1954, 
the data used by Henry and Short extends only up through 1947. Hence, 
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there has been no analysis of post-World \·lar II trends in the United 
States. A replication utilizing data up to 1974 (latest figures 
available) would allow us to determine if there are any differences 
bet"\veen pre- and post-war periods. Recent research, while not con-
clusive, would seem to indicate that the trends between homicide, 
suicide and economic conditions previously reviewed below may not 
presently be as constant as might be assumed. For instance, Lester 
(1971) found a +.61 correlation between homicide and suicide in the 
United States for the years 1950-1964. This is in direct opposition 
to the results of Henry and Short who generally found homicide and 
suicide inversely related to each other. 
Related to this issue of trends over time, is the fact that 
there is also a great deal of inconsistency between the various 
researchers regarding the relationship between homicide, crime and 
economic conditions. As Table 1 indicates, only delinquency is con-
sistently related in a positive direction with economic conditions. 
Homicide, property crimes and assaults are, at ·best, inconclusive 
regarding their relationships with social prospecity. Nettler (1978: 
140), after reviewing the research over the years on this topic, goes 
so far as to state that "serious crimes are associated ecologically 
(in social and physical space within a society) with relative econom-
ic deprivation. However, such crimes are not associated historically 
(in time) or comparatively (across cultures) wi~~ relative impoverish-
ment" (original emphasis) • 
Sellins' (1937) contention is that the nature of the crime index 
may be the major influence in these results. What is required is not 
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~n index of the number of prison admissions for certain crimes or the 
number of arraingrnents for various crimes, but rather, the actual 
number of crimes known as having been committed. Any other crime 
index is essentially reflective of the process between the commis-
sion of certain crimes and society's disposition of the accused 
culprit. These indices do not reflect the actual crime rate, but 
rather, reflect society's reaction to the crime. This reaction may or 
may not be congruent with the actual incidence of crime in society. 
Given this argument, it is proposed that the rates of actual crimes 
committed be used as the main index of crime. It is hoped that such 
an analysis of homicide and other crimes will result in clearing up 
the inconsistencies found to date. 
:-1ethodo logy 
In order to replicate Henry and Short's research this study us~d 
similar dependent and independent variables. The dependent variables 
are national homicide and suicide rates (broken down by sex, race and 
change categories). The independent variables are such economic indi-
caters as national unemployment rates, the Federal Reserve Board 
Indicators of Industrial~1anufacturing Production, the Consumer Price 
Index, Personal Per Capita Income and Personal Per Capita Savings. 
Although each of these indices measure different aspects of the 
economy, there does exist a high degree of multicollinarity between 
them. Using all these indicators enables us to (1) determine which 
particular index is most closely related to crime and social path-
ology and (2) is there is a consistent relationship between these 
economic variables and the dependent variables. Thul)i,--• in /..,.,-·--
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second instance, the use of more than one economic indicator allows 
us to determine whether whatever statistical association is established 
is a function of a true relation between the economy and social path-
ology and not merely a specious correlation due to the peculiar 
qualities of one index. 
The data was acquired from various governmental agencies and 
sources. Such primary sources as the Uniform Crime Report, The 
Mortality Statistics of the United States, the Statistical Abstract 
of the United States and the Historical Statistics of the United 
States as well as other reports and publications were utilized in 
order to obtain the necessary statistics. It is important to note 
that the rates of the dependent variables should be viewed as under-
estimates of the actual occurrence rate of these social phenomena. 
For various social, economic and religious reasons, suicides are 
often not reported officially as such with the result that estimates 
of under-reporting are as high as 17-25 percent (Dublin, 1963). 
Similar criticisms have been made regarding official tabulations of 
crime rates. For example, prior to the establishment of the Uniform 
Crime Report (UCR) in the early 1~30s.there were no fully national 
homicide statistics. Nhat statistics were available, such as those 
used by Hoffman (1925) and Brearly (1932) were very much dependent 
upon regional reporting sources. The UCR has been subject to various 
criticisms regarding the techniques it utilizes in establishing the 
various crime rates (Wolfgang, 1963; w. J. Chambliss and Nagassawa, 
1969). Some of the criticisms lodged against the UCR involve regional 
differences in reporting crime rates as well as organizational influ-
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ences which affect crime tabulations (for a review of some of the 
problems regarding crime rate statistics, see Zahn, 19804· 
However valid these particular critiques may be, Block (1977) 
reviewed the validity of such alternatives to the UCR as victimiza-
tion studies and concluded that both "the UCR and victimization sur-
veys are equally good indicators of trends in crimes ••• " (p. 18). 
Since this particular study is concerned with longitudinal trends in 
crime rates, it is felt that the use of official statistics was both 
adequate and valid. With regards to the suicide rates, it will be 
assumed (cautiously) that underestimates are uniformly distributed 
(there is little or nothing in the literature to indicate othen~ise) 
and accordingly, national rates are adequate indicators of trends 
(Gibbs, 1971). A second, weaker argument may be made that the use of 
such rates have both a historical and sociological tradition (e.g., 
Durkheim) • Given this tradition and since "truer" estimates are not 
available, it is felt that a cautious use of such rates is valid for 
this study. 
The statistical model which is most appropriate for our study is 
that of multi-variate regressive time-series analysis. Various time-
series techniques have been developed for the analysis of the data used 
in our research. However, as Land and Felson (1978) point out, each 
method has its advantages and disadvantages. For instance, the Box-
Jenkins method is not suitable for causal hypothesis while spectral 
analysis requires at least 100 time points for suitable application. 
Our data only allows for a maximum of 52 (1919-1974) time points. 
(Although Vigderhouse (1977) has developed a Box-Jenkins method for 
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multivariate causal analysis, he takes the position that other 
techniques may be more applicable depending upon one's theoretical 
perspective and type of data being used) . The third and most 
commonly used method involves a structural equation model, i.e., a 
variation of a multiple-regression model. Leabo (1976) states that 
the procedure most used by econometricians is that of stepwise regres-
sion. 
A major difficulty wi~~ utilizing time-series correlations is 
that of autocorrelation (or serial correlation), which can be defined 
as the correlation of members of a time series with themselves. Since 
time-series analysis does not involve the randomly sampling of vari-
ables but rather a totality of successive observations over a period 
of time points, a major problem may arise with regards to the non-
independence of these time points. For example, the homicide rate 
for 1960 may partially be a result of the crime rates of previous 
years (for an excellent description of the factors which influence 
autocorrelation see Kennedy, 1980). Leabo (op. cit) lists five 
specific techniques which may allow one to develop a trend-free 
regression model which controlling for autocorrelation. They are (l) 
the correlation of first-differences, (2) transforming the raw data 
of each variable into its logarithmic function (natural log or log 
10), (3) the correlation of the first-differences of the logarithmic 
transformations, (4) the correlations of the percentage differences 
(annual) of the logged data, and (5) the correlation of the annual 
percentage differences of the raw data. As Leabo points out, the 
determination as to which technique is "best" is usually based on the 
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degree of autocorrelation within the data used, i.e., the technique 
which offers the highest non-autocorrelated coefficients is generally 
considered the most efficacious. In terms of our data, the only 
statistical technique which provided non-autocorrelated coefficients 
was the correlation of the first-differences of our variables. All 
of the other techniques suggested by Leabo provided speciaously high 
autocorrelated coefficients. What is significant for our research is 
that first-differences specifically measure the absolute rate of change 
between both the dependent and independent variables over time--the 
theoretical concept with which we are most concerned with eLand and 
Felson, op. cit.). 
As was mentioned above, a major difficulty with time-series 
correlations is that of autocorrelations. The test most applicable 
for the determ~nation of autocorrelation is the Durbin-Watson (d) 
statistic. As Leabo (op. cit., p. 499) points out, "If the D-W 
statistic is between 1.5 and 2.5 serial correlation is not signifi-
cant. If the o-w computed values is below 1.5 there might be positive 
serial correlation between residuals of the fitted data and the 
actual data. If the o-w statistic is greater than 2.5 negative serial 
correlation might be present." 
A final point should be made, as many authors have noted (Vigder-
house, op. cit.; Leabo, ibid.; Kennedy, op. cit.) time-series analysis 
is a statistical technique which utilized various approacheS and 
models based on the researcher' s theoretical perspective and practical 
(statistical) skills and abilities. Thus simpler models may actually 
provide more insight into social pheno~na than more complex models. 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The Early Pre-War Period 
(1919-1929) 
The purpose of this section is to analyze and discuss our data. 
we will begin by comparing our pre- and post-war economic coefficients 
with the findings of Henry and Short (1954) • 
-
To briefly reiterate, Henry and Short postulated two basic sets 
of hypotheses: (1) suicide rates vary negatively with economic activity 
while homicide rates vary positively with economic conditions, and (2) 
that due to certain childrearing practices and their resultant per-
sonality predispositions, higher status individuals will be prone 
towards suicide while lower status individuals will be prone towards 
homicides. 
However, as pointed out earlier, there is some question whether 
Durkheim's theory of anomie and social deviance was adequately 
operationalized by Henry and Short. For instance, as Marshall (1981) 
and Pierce (op. cit.) rightly point out, Durkheim's emphasis was upon 
economic change rather than economic activity per se. Henry and Short, 
as well as other researchers, have singularly dealt with economic 
change. Our use of first-differences measures changes in both the 
independent and dependent variables, i.e., the annual differences over 
time as opposed to simply correlating absolute annual rates. Thus, 
our coefficients represent the relationship between annual changes in 
the dependent and independent variables. 
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Our pre-war data tend to partially contradict the Henry and Short 
proposition regarding economic conditions and homicides and suicides. 
For each of our aggregate suicide and homicide groups (Table 2) there 
is an inverse relationship between the annual changes in suicide and 
homicide and the annual changes of our economic indicators. In terms 
of suicide, the strongest relationship between economic change and 
changes in suicide rates was for males (r2 = .61) with the lowest c 
2 
change relationships found among white females and blacks (r = .32 
respectively). Given the directionality of our coefficients--negative 
for industrial-manufacturing production and the consumer price index 
and positive for unemployment--it is apparent that negative economic 
change tends to positively influence changes in the suicide rates. 
The only category which does not reflect this trend was female sui-
cides (especially white female suicide~). While all other categories 
showed a positive long-term relationship with unemployment for this 
period, white females exhibit a negative relationship. 
Looking at changes in homicide rates, we find a similar direc-
tionality in our coefficients even though the r-squares are lower than 
for the suicides. The highest r 2 is found for the rate of change 
2 
among white males (r = .46) with the lowest being for black females 
2 (r = .04). This finding is interesting in the light of Henry and 
Short's findings. Henry and Short postulated that homicide would vary 
positively with economic conditions and that this relationship would 
be stronger for blacks than for whites. Our findings again indicate 
the opposite. Changes in economic conditions have little or no 
effect upon the changes in homicide rates among blacks. What slight 
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tendency does appear to exist, would seem to indicate that the direc-
tion of economic change on black homicides is negative (an extrem~ly 
weak finding) for this time period. 
Pre-~var Plots 
In looking at our plots for this prewar period (Plots 1-16) we can 
.better visualize the relationships between our variables. Plot 1 shows 
the negative relationship which exists between changes in white male 
suicides and changes in industrial-manufacturing production. From 1920 
to 1929, the suicides of white males consistently changed in a direc-
tion opposite to that of changes in the economy. This trend is more 
strongly exemplified in Plot 2. where, during the same time period, 
changes in white male suicide rates are virtually synchronous with 
changes in unemployment rates. Exceptions to these trends appear to 
occur during the Depression years (1929-1941). For example, while 
yearly increases in unemployment peaks in 1932, yearly increases in 
white male suicides peaked in 1930 and declined to their lowest point 
in 1933. A similar anomalie exists during the 1934-1937 time period 
whereby unemployment is basically declining while the white male 
suicide rates are either decreasing at diminishing annual rates or are 
increasing positively. In 1937~1938 unemployment rates experienced a 
drastic increase while white male suicide rates experienced a slight 
decline. 
Plots 3 and 4 indicate the change between annual fluctuations in 
the white female suicide rates and industrial-manufacturing produc-
tion and unemployment. These plots exemplify our coefficients quite 
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well (Table 2). While both of our independent variables indicate 
great variations in terms of annual changes, white female suicide-rates 
exhibit little or no variance indicating a random walk pattern. 
Regarding black male suicides (Plots 5-6) we find that prior to 
1929, the annual variation in black male suicides was almost synchron-
ous with yearly changes in industrial-manufacturing production 
(r = -.78). A short-term discrepancy occurs during the 1929 to 1933 
Depression period. Here, despite the drastic annual declines in 
industrial-manufacturing production, the annual changes in the black 
male suicide ra~es show very litt~e variation. A second anomaly 
occurs between 1934- and 1936 when both the suicide and industrial-
manufacturing rates increased in a positive direction. During the 
1937-1938 recession black male suicides show little variance despite 
the large drop in industrial-manufacturing production. For the rest 
of the period (1939-1941) the relationship between the two variables 
appears more stable. In terms of black male suicide and unemployment, 
we again find that prior to the Depression, black male suicides moved 
concomitantly in a positive direction with annual changes in unemploy-
ment. There is little variation in the suicide rates from 1929 to 
1932. From that point on, both variables appear positively synchron-
ized until 1939-1940 when there occurs a positive increase in suicide 
rates and a sharp decline in unemployment. 
Black female suicides (Plots 7-8) present a similar pattern for 
this period. With industrial-manufacturing production, black female 
suicides show a fairly consistent negative relationship from 1920 to 
1927. From 1927-1933 the black female suicide rates show little 
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yearly change despite radical annual fluctuations in our economic 
independent variable. In the next period from 1934 to 1941 we find a 
somewhat greater degree of annual change in the suicide rates 
negatively concomitant with industrial-manufacturing production. In 
terms of black female suicides and unemployment again we find a 
greater synchronicity between our variables during the pre-1930 period 
than during the Depression. Here the differences between the two 
periods are quite noticeable. 
Between 1929 and 1933 we find very little change in the annual 
suicide rates relative to unemployment. In the 1933-1934 period we 
find an increase in suicide rates while unemployment declined for that 
period. An additional discrepant finding occurs during the 1937-1938 
recession when unemployment increased while black female suicides 
declined slightly. A similar situation occurred from 1939-1940 when 
unemployment declined drastically and suicide rates increased. 
Turning to our homicide graphs for this pre-war period, the find-
ings indicate that the strongest relationship between annual changes 
in the economy and changes in homicide rates occurred for while males 
(Plots 9 and 10) • Prior to 1929 white male homicidea ch~nged nega-
tively with industrial-manufacturing production and positively with 
yearly changes in unemployment. Anomalies occur in 1924-1925 and 
1927-1928 when both indudstrial-manufacturing production increased 
positively as did the white male homicide rates. In the Depression 
period (1929-1941) we find white male homicides increasing from 1929 
to 1930 and then changing in a downward direction as industrial-manu-
facturing production increased in 1931-1932. From 1933 to 1941 white 
male homicides experienced negative annual changes while industrial-
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manufacturing production basically moved in a positive direction (the 
exception to this occurs during the 1937-1938 recession which do~s not 
appear to have had much of an effect on changes in the white male 
homicide rates). Looking at our graph for changes in unemployment and 
white male homicides we notice a fairly consistent synchronicity be-
tween the two variables. Again, changes in homicide rates reach a 
positive peak in 1929-1930 while unemployment reaches its peak in 
1931-1932. It appears that the 1937-1938 recession had little or no 
impact on changes in the white male homicide rates. For that matter, 
all of the yearly changes in homicide rates from 1933 to 1941 were 
negative changes indicating annual declines in the variable declines 
in the homicide rates. 
Changes in white female homicide rates show very little vari-
ability in our graphs (Plots 11 and 12). Neither of our two inde-
pendent variables produced very much in terms of drastic fluctua-
tions in the homicide rates for this category. Despite this seeming 
lack of variability our coefficients (Table 2) indicates that the 
fluctuations in our independent variables were not wholly without any 
effect.Despite the lack of radical change in our dependent variable, 
the directionality of what changes did occur are consistent--
especially for the 1920-1929 time period. The Depression period 
shows a lesser consistency between changes in white female homicide 
rates and our two independent variables. 
Changes in the homicide rates for black males indicates a high 
degree of variability but very little synchronicity of direction 
(Plots 13 and 14). This is especially true with industrial~nu-
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facturing production (r = -.03). Looking at changes in the unemployment 
rates and black male homicides, we can discern two basic patterns 
regarding the yearly changes between our two variables. Prior to the 
Depression we find negative fluctuations between unemployment changes 
and changes in black male homicides. During the Depression the 
direction our variables change tends toward a more slightly positive 
direction. During the 1919-1929 period black male homicides appear 
to increase annually as unemployment decreases (e.g., 1921-1923) and 
decrease when unemployment increased (e.g., 1926-1928). 
During the onset of the Depression period we find black male 
homicides changing from annual declines during the late twenties to 
positive increases from 1929 ~ a peak in 1931. There was a drastic 
decline in 1932 (the peak year for unemployment) with a radical 
increase from 1932-1933 when unemployment declined. The next radical 
. 
anomaly occurred from 1937-1938 when unemployment increased drastic-
ally while black male homicide rates declined. 
Changes in black female homici~es (Plots 15-16} also exhibit a 
great deal of variability over our pr.e-world vlar II time period. 
Again we find that prior to 1929 there is a greater synchronicity 
between annual changes in our dependent and independent variables. 
During the 1927-1928 period black female homicides declined while 
industrial-manufacturing production moved upwardly. However, there 
were no changes in the homicide rates from 1929-1930 with an actual 
decline from 1930 to 1931 and only a slight increase in 1932. In 
1935-1936 black female homicides increased concomitantly with 
industrial-manufacturing production only to decline during the 1937-
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1938 recession. In terms of unemployment, again a weak consistency 
exists betw~en the annual changes of our two variables. However,_ after 
1929 the relationship between the variables reflects an almost random 
pattern which is also indicated by our coefficient for that period 
(Table 4, r = -.04). 
These findings are also somewhat inconsistent with those found 
by Brenner (1976) • Considering the nature of our findings and those 
of Brenner (as well as those of Henry and Short) it is useful to 
review Brenner's theory. 
As we stated in a previous section, Brenner asserts that while 
there exists a long-term positive relationship between homicide and 
economic growth, there is alsq a strong positive relationship between 
short-term radical declines in the economy and growth in the homicide 
rates. The proof for this, according to Brenner, is that homicide 
rates increased during a period of the Great Depression (1929-1936) • 
He explains the discrepancy in relationships between the economy and 
homicide in terms of the stress response of two different subpopula-
tion groups. Although Brenner never e~plicitly states this, he 
certainly implies that those who commit homicide during economic 
prosperity may be subject to relative deprivation while those who 
engage in the same behavior during period of radical economic decline 
may be responding to "absolute deprivation" or absolute economic loss. 
Although the notion of absolute economic loss is being applied 
to homicides in terms of his theoretical perspective, it is also 
applicable for explaining suicide rates during economic recessions. 
For instance, Breed (1963) found that a majority of suicides occurred 
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in situations in which there was an intergenerational diminution of 
occupational status {this is also similar to the status-loss pos~tion 
of Gibbs and Porterfield, 1960) • Whether such a decline in achieved 
status is due to personality variables {a certain possibility regard-
ing suicides) or to socioeconomic conditions per se. is a problematic 
issue beyond the scope of this paper. However, our statistics, as 
well as those of other researchers, lends empirical credence to the 
logical notion that drastic economic declines, such as the Great 
Depression, can lead to status declines in the population. Rushing 
{1968) found that the highest rates of suicide dichtomously occurred 
among those who occupied high occupational status positions and those 
who occupied low status positions. If the theoretical implications 
of the two studies mentioned above are applied to Brenner's findings, 
absolute deprivation may be responsible for the economic decline in 
status among upper-income individuals while relative deprivation may 
account for lower-status suicides. 
In order to better analyze and explain our own results, we have 
partially replicated Brenner by dividing the time periods 1920-1929, 
1930-1941. It should be emphasized that there are certain methodo-
logical problems in dividing our data into two such time periods. 
Statistically such a division lowers the number of data points avail-
able for analysis. Since we are dealing with a regression model 
having three economic variables in one time period and five in 
another, this may cast some doubt on our findings in terms of the 
total amount of variance explained. However, there is some justifi-
cation for this approach. To start, we are doing this to either 
contend or reinforce Brenner's findings which utilized a similar 
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number of data points (1929-1936). Secondly, we are not dealing with a 
random sample of data but rather a continuity of time points in the 
hope of discerning short-term trends between our variables. Should 
there be a strong correlation between our variables for one time 
period but no relationship in the next time period, it becomes obvious 
that some social phenomenon is taking place which requires theoretical 
explain explaining. Lastly, as our plots graphically illustrate, 
there is a greater consistency in the relationships between our vari-
ables during the 1920-1929 period than during the Great Depression. 
This, in itself, would warrant an analysis of the coefficients for 
both period$. Thus, despite the statistical drawbacks in utilizing a 
small number of data points, we feel that there are certain theoret-
ical justifications for doing so. 
Theoretically, following Brenner's results we should find a 
positive relationship between economic growth and homicide for the 
first period and a negative relationship in the latter period. our 
findings for both time periods--both homicides and suicides are 
presented in Tables 3 and 4. These findings contradict those 
reported by Brenner and by Henry and Short. 
What is interesting about our findings is that Brenner attri-
buted the pre-war negative relationship between economic growth and 
homicide to the radical declines in the economy occurring during the 
1929-1936 Great Depression period. His implication is that for the 
pre-war period the radical decline in the economy for those specific 
years, and the concomitant increase in homicide rates was so great 
as to change the direction of the coefficients from a positive to a 
48 
negative relationship. Our data, however, show that the negative 
relationship between changes in homicide rates and economic change is 
even stronger during the pre-depression period than is found during 
the Great Depression (1920-1929-r2 = .80, 1930-1941-r2 = .52). 
A possible explanation for our differences with Brenner and Henry 
and Short may have to do with our statistical model. While we have 
been primarily concerned with the nature of economic change and its 
relationship with changes in homicide and suicide, Vigderhous (1978) 
found that economic change does not exert as important an effect as 
economic acitivity on the suicide rate. Thus, our findings could be 
an artifact of using economic change as opposed to economic activity. 
If, in fact, economic change has less of an influence on deviance than 
economic activity, then Durkheim's proposition is not truly substan-
tiated. Durkheim, however, posited that rapid and radical change 
would lead to anomie, i.e., a state of relative normlessness ("society 
cannot change its structure suddenly any grave and rapid • 
alteration must be morbid," 1951, p. 369). This change could be 
either positive or negative, i.e., if viewed in terms of economics 
it may be positive economic growth or negative economic growth. 
Theoretically this would lead to increase in forms of deviance due to 
the disruption of the value systems of society. These disruptions 
may not necessarily be of a quantitative nature; they could also be 
a result of qualitative factors (Hinkle, 1976). Hence, economic 
activity·reflects basic qualitative changes in the value structure of 
society at any given historical period. 
For example, Pierce (1967) showed that the suicide rates coin-
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cide with popular expectations as to what future socioeconomic condi-
tions will be like. Marshall (1981) in a study of the effects of war 
on suicide, showed that the diminution of the suicide rates during 
wartime could be attributed to declines in the unemployment rates. 
However, these unemployment rates only declined due to a war situa-
tion. Archer and Gartner (1976), in studying the increases in homi-
cide rates occurring during war periods and immediately afterwards 
found that such increases were more a function of the residual legi-
timation of wartime violence than of economic growth or declines. Ted 
Robert Gurr's (1979) study of the history of crime in Western society 
also found that while crime could be attributed to anomie conditions, 
these conditions themselves may be the result of factors other than 
economic ones, e.g., the mass media, technological growth, the age of 
the population, the degree of urbanization, etc. Other researchers, 
in both criminology and suicidology, have shown that the form of 
behavior aggression may take can be a result of subcultural norms 
(e.g., Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967; Porterfield, 1952; Archer and 
Gartner, op. cit.). 
Although our coefficients and findings tend to contradict those 
of Brenner and Henry and Short, they do indicate that economic changes 
did have some variable effects on changes in both homicide and suicide 
rates. Perhaps, the theoretical concepts of relative and/or absolute 
deprivation can help us to explain our pre-war findings. In order to 
determine this we must look at specific aggregate categories for both 
per-war periods. 
During the 1920-1929 period all of our aggregate categories, 
so 
with the exception of black males, show high coefficients between 
homicides and negative economic growth (Table 3) • The black male. 
categories show a reverse tendency, while the black female homicides 
correspond to the other aggregate groups. These trends could cor-
respond to a situation of economic relative deprivation insofar that 
black males would experience unemployment during economic growth and 
prosperity when unemployment is generally low. For black females, who 
generally occupied a greater participation in the labor force vis-a-
vis their male counterparts, the situation would be the opposite. One 
would expect these black females to be primarily involved in unskilled 
occupations, given their social status relative to the white labor 
force; hence they would be among the first to experience unemployment 
during an economic recession or depression. 
Although the above explanation may account for black homicide 
rates, how does one explain the high coefficients for the other 
aggregate categories, especially for a decade traditionally noted for 
its prosperity and economic growth? A possible solution might be 
found in looking at some of the statistical and social conditions of 
that period. 
First, with regards to statistics and homicide data accumulated 
prior to the development of the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), in the 
early 1930s the data available for national homicide statistics was 
essentially local in character--as was the data found in the Vital 
Statistics (Zahn, 1980). Early studies, such as Brearly (1932), 
tended to utilize these statistics in order to discern trends in the 
United States. Brearly tried to show that there was a steady 
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increase in homicide rates which reached a peak in 1928. (Actually, 
as a matter of public record, the homicide rate began a steady annual 
increase in 1923 and reached its peak in 1933.) Brearly felt that 
part of the explanation for this increase in homicide rates as being 
due to the inclusion of Western and Southern states into the UCR. 
These states traditionally have had higher homicide rates. An addi-
tional variable used to explain the rise in homicides was the impact 
of prohibition and its relationship to criminal violence (Zahn, op. 
cit.) • 
As is well known, the 1920s was the period of the notorious 
"beer wars" in which various underworld criminal factions viciously 
fought among themselves for "territorial" rights to illegal liquor 
sales and distribution. This, of course, led to the ultimate develop-
ment of organized crime as we know it today. (Block and Block, 1981, 
cite a report which indicates that law enforcement in Chicago prac-
tically broke down due to these violent gang wars.) How do these 
factors relate to our findlngs? In order to answer this question we 
must briefly look at American society in the decade of the 1920s. 
(All references substantiating our description of this period come 
from Allen, 1931; Hacker and Zahler, 1952; Hacker and Kendrick, 1949; 
Freidel, 1976; and Dubofsky and Theoharis, 1978). 
Traditionally the period of 1919-1929 has been known as the 
"era of prosperity and growth." In addition to the economic changes 
we will describe below, it was a period of radical changes in socie-
tal morals, norms and values. The 1920s saw the start of feminist 
movements, increases in the divorce rate and what Edmund Wilson 
52 
called "the spirit of hedonism." Change in social values were both 
exemplified and stimulated by the popular and formal cultures of the 
time. Popular music, socially diffused by the rapid spread of radio 
in the late twenties, personified the frenzy and amorality of the 
upper•classes. In literature, the major themes were of sexual 
experimentation, moral disillusionment and a disenchantment with 
traditional American values. In reaction to these trends came a 
surge of conservatism and traditionalism. The Ku Klux Klan found a 
new resurgence, not only in the South but in the North as well, 
gathering support against blacks, Jews, Catholics, new immigrants and 
antiprohibitionists. Prohibition was passed with the Volstead Act. 
Fundamentalist preachers rallied against sexual immorality, gambling, 
drinking and even Darwin's theory of evolution. The period of the 
early twenties was marked by violent strikes and anti-union feelings. 
Immigration was curtailed because of a fear of European Communists 
and Anarchists. A fear which culminated with Attorney General 
Palmer's notorious "red raids." 
As for the economy, both the media and politicians hailed the 
prosperity of the era and even predicted the coming end to all 
poverty in the United States. Although all economic predictors 
heralded good times, a closer look indicates that this prosperity was 
precarious. Productivity was geared toward the creation and market-
ing of durable consumer goods. By 1927, 11 percent of all goods were 
purchased on install~nt contracts at a retail value of nearly $6 
million; yet, in 1929, 71 percent of American families earned 
incomes of under $2,500 annually--a level considered by the govern-
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ment minimal for health. Other figures further describe this unequal 
distribution of wealth. After taxes, the top 5 percent of the popula-
tion received over 33 percent of the national income (1929) • The same 
skewed distribution of wealth occurred among businesses. In 1929 the 
top 5 percent of business corporations earned 84 percent of business 
income. 
Although wages and earnings increased during the 1920s, unem-
ployment continued to fluctuate and remain high among the working-
classes. In the Northern states the increased use of technology and 
mass production eliminated the jobs of thousands of workers. Through-
out the twenties, the New England states suffered from a chronic 
economic recession due to their declining textile and shoe industries. 
T~e main competition came from the South where women and children 
toiled in the mills from 54 to 70 hours per week, the average hourly 
wage for a male weaver was twenty-five cents and, for a female 
spinner, seventeen cents. 
Thousands of coal miners--from western Pennsylvania to southern 
Illinois-~ere unemployed extensively throughout the twenties as were 
railroad workers. Both New England and the coal regions were chronic-
ally depressed. Nationally, the median unemployment rate for the 
twenties was 13 percent. Coupled with these geographic areas were 
the rural-agricultural regions. Due to growing technology, food 
production increased faster than consumer demand resulting in food 
surpluses. As a result, between 1919 and 1929 farm income declined 
30 percent, farm property values declined 10 percent while indebted-
ness increased. One of the results of this agricultural depression 
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was a migration from rural to urban and other rural areas. From 1920 
to 1928 the rural population declined over 3 million. During the.same 
period, urban populations increased over 15 million (during a decade of 
declining birth rates and low foreign immigration) • At the same time, 
black populations in such Northern cities such as Chicago, Detroit, 
Cleveland, Gary and New York increased from 108 to 239 percent. 
The dislocation and migration of unskilled rural workers to urban 
areas generally leads to urban disorganization and anomie conditions 
with concomitant increases in both personal violence and property 
crimes. This can occur despite the fact that overall long-term 
economic growth may be on the rise--as was the case during the 
twenties. Although an economy may experience long-term economic 
growth, it will be subject to short-term declines or "mini-reces-
sions" (a point which both Brenner and Henry and Short acknowledge) • 
For Brenner, these "cyclic" declines are reflections of absolute loss 
or deprivation and are indicated by "declines in employment and 
income, as measured chiefly by fluctuations in the unemployment rate. 
Economic loss is additionally measured by annual percentage changes in 
the rate of inflation" (Brenner, op. cit., p. 571). 
our data indicate that changes in the rate of homicide for the 
twenties were sensitive to the rate of change in economic conditions 
2 (r = .80). However, since not all members of society are equally 
affected by such "mini recessions" and the economy itself during the 
twenties was so variable, it is logical to assume that only certain 
subpopulations are represented in the homicide rates. For our white 
aggregate categories and for black females, absolute deprivation may 
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be an explanatory factor, while for black males relative deprivation 
could very possibly be a cause for their homicides. For this particu-
lar aggregate group, their homicide rate increased as economic condi-
tions (especially unemployment) became better. Thus they experienced 
more economic deprivation, while our. other groups experienced rela-
tively "good" times. 
If we consider the black rural to urban migration during this 
period, it may be that those black males who migrated to Northern 
urban areas experienced an increase in homicide rates due to .the trans-
position of Southern "cultures of violence" and to the experience of 
social and personal disorganization in an urban environment perceived 
as being threatening by these newly arrived immigrants (Pettigrew and 
Spier, 1962). 
For our purposes then, discounting the influential effects of 
organized crime on the murder rates of the twenties, we can largely 
attribute the homicide rates of that period to the deprivations 
experienced by the lower-working classes (urban) and to the rural 
indigent who participated in the great migrations of the period. As 
Brenner points out, "the major variation in criminal statistics lie in 
economic instability and inequality. In both of these cases, however, 
the common basis of causation lies in comparatively low socioeconomic 
status, whether that situation has occurred unexpectedly or represents 
a chronic pattern" (op. cit., p. 571). 
It is also interesting to note that Brearly partially attributed 
the increase in homicide rates to the inclusion of Southern and 
Western states into the UCR. Many of these states were the same 
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which experienced a chronic agricultural recession during the twenties. 
Although there is no exact way of knowing, it may be that the traqi-
tionally high homicide rates of these areas were exacerbated by the 
depression and migrations of the times. 
In looking at the suicide rates for the twenties we'generally 
find a negative relationship between changes in the economy and 
changes in the suicide rate. This is interesting in light of the 
fact that suicide rates consistently increased on an annual basis from 
1923 (reaching a peak in 1932). It would appear, then, that was the 
situation with our homicide groups, subpopulations were differentially 
affected by these changes in the economy. For example, while white 
male suicide rates varied nega~ively with economic conditions, unem-
ployment did not enter into our regression equation, i.e., changes in 
unemployment rates did not contribute to any changes in the white male 
suicide rates for this time period. However, declines in manufactur-
ing production and inflation did have an effect on white male suicide 
rates. 
If we accept the numerous findings that suicide (especially among 
males) is related to either high or low occupational status positions 
we may be able to explain the findings we obtained for this particu-
lar aggregate group. In order to do this, we will try to identify 
particular groups most susceptible to suicide during this period. 
The first group were probably those white males in upper-occu-
pational status positions. These men would be susceptible to the 
stresses of a recession (as indicated by declines in industrial-
manufacturing production and lowering inflation) but would not be 
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influenced per se by increases in unemployment. Those men most influ-
enced by changes in the unemployment rates generally came from the· 
skilled and particularly, unskilled laboring classes. There is addi-
tional evidence to support this position. Dublin and Bunzel (1933) 
correlated an index of business prosperity with suicides for the years 
1910-1931. They found a strong negative correlation between suicide 
and business prosperity. However, when they correlated the same vari-
ables for unskilled laborers and wage earners, they found the coeffi-
cient to have diminished considerable. Given their economic indicator, 
they concluded that those most affected by declines in business pros-
perity were "men in positions of prominence and responsibility" (Dublin, 
1963, p. 66). A related study by Rushing {1968) found that males in 
upper-occupational status categories tended to commit suicide to a 
greater extent during periods of high employment. Does not a decline 
in manufacturing production result in an increase in unemployment? As 
various econometricians have pointed out, industrial-manufacturing 
production is considered a lead variable, i.e., it generally precedes 
other economic variables such as unemployment (Leabo, 1976). 
The second group of white males who would be susceptible to these 
economic conditions are the chronically unemployed, i.e., those who 
experienced unemployment during relatively "good" economic times and 
are now faced with the prospects of declining prosperity and job 
opportunity. Why these individuals were unemployed is a difficult 
question to answer. As Douglas (1967) points out, lack of employment 
for these "marginal" laborers may be due to a lack of occupational 
skills (e.g., migrant farm workers who move to urban-industrial 
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areas), personality variables such as mental illness or alcoholism, 
physical illnesses, various forms of social, ethnic and geographic 
pr-ejudice, etc. For these chronically unemployed, the prospect of an 
advent of hard economic times may even increase their stress and sorrow 
and further lower their prospects for future employment. If one cannot 
get a job during economic "good" times, how is one to get a job during 
economic "bad" times? 
A more problematic aggregate category is white female suicides. 
Their rates during this time period are positively related to changes 
in the economy. Thus, the more our economic indicators moved in a 
positive direction, the more the white female suicides increased. 
Despite this finding, it should be noted that our r 2 for this particu-
2 lar group was the lowest of all of our categories (r = .45). While 
somewhat disconcerting this finding was not wholly unexpected. Dublin 
and Bunzel (op. cit.) found no significant relationship between the 
suicide of white females and economic prosperity. Although our results 
for this group are not high, they are high enough to merit some 
interpretation. To start, females (especially white) did not consti-
tute a major portion of the labor force during the twenties. Thus, 
they would be influenced by economic conditions primarily through the 
I 
activities of their spouses since their income and their family's 
income was dependent upon their spouse's earning capabilities. A 
situation of relative deprivation could occur if, for some reason, 
the spouse would be unable to work or provide economic support--
especially if economic conditions were good or improving. 
The opposite situation appears to apply to black female suicides. 
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Their coefficients are very negatively related to economic change. 
However, as we pointed out earlier, black females were participants in 
the labor force and so would be affected by negative economic changes. 
A final point should be considered, that is, our black (both male 
and female) aggregate categories have much higher suicide coefficients 
than homicide coefficients, suggesting that changes in black suicide 
rates were more sensitive to changes in economic conditions than were 
black homicide rates. This is interesting in light of the fact that 
(1) homicides are ~ higher than suicides. among blacks and (2) 
suicide was very seldom considered a culturally accepted "way out" 
among blacks (Lalli and Turner, 1968). A possible explanation for 
this finding may be that blackhomicide rates are more randomly dis-
tributed over time primarily being a result of the black cultural 
structure (Lalli and Turner, ibid.) and only marginally influenced by 
the frustrations of relative deprivation, while the suicides primarily 
occur among economically upwardly mobile blacks who experience rela-
tive deprivation and ultimately a form of psychological fatalism. 
This proposition is partially·s~stantiated by the fact that, during 
the decade of the twenties, homicide rates for black males were 
positively though weakly related to economic conditions while suicide 
was negatively related to the same. The same was not the case for 
black females who, as ~e stated above, experienced a greater partici-
pation in the labor force. For them, both homicide and suicide were 
negatively related to changes in the economy. Since it is reasonable 
to assume that black female homicides mostly result from black male 
murderous behavior (as in the case for white groups), it may be that 
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black males (whatever the social or domestic relationship) vented 
their aggressions upon their female counterparts during periods of 
economic decline and loss of income. 
Summary 
Our purpose was to investigate the relationship be~een annual 
changes in certain economic indicators with changes in certain forms 
of deviant behavior, i.e., homicide and suicide. Our initial goal was 
to merely replicate the study conducted by Henry and Short which 
basically covered the years 1919-1949. However, a recent ~tudy by 
Harvey Brenner forc~d us to divide our pre-war historical period of 
analysis into two time periods--1919-1929, 1930-1941--which resulted 
in findings contrary to both of the above researches. 
Despite certain possible methodological problems in dividing our 
pre-waF time period, we found that the coefficients for our dependent 
variables for this early period (1919-1929) exhibited an extreme 
sensitivity (with certain exceptions) to annual fluctuations in our 
independent economic variables. We attempted to explain our findings 
in terms of the relative social changes which took place for certain 
segments of the population. That is, while there existed an aura of 
prosperity for the nation as a whole, certain segments of the popula-
tio~ (skilled and especially semi-skilled and agricultural workers) 
were relatively deprived of what economic benefits existed. These 
individuals suffered from not only relative deprivation but also from 
the anxieties of radical fluctuations in the national economy at this 
time. 
THE DEPRESSION YEARS 
(1930-1941) 
Turning now to the period of the Great Depression (1930-1941) we 
find a substantial drop in our coefficients (Table 4). This decline 
is contrary to Brenner's contention that the negative correlation 
between homicide and his economic indicators for the pre-war period 
was primarily due to the extreme effects of the 1929-1936 period, i.e., 
the radical effects of these years depressed the overall long-term 
positive relationship between homicide and economic growth. 
Not only are the homicide coefficients negative during the 
twenties, but the relationships between homicide change and economic 
change were higher during that period than during the Great Depression 
period. This relation, is in fact, substantively stronger than the 
ones discussed in the preceding chapter because we have added two 
additional economic variables to the analysis--personal savings and 
personal income--for which there were no data available prior to 1929. 
There are three basic changes in our homicide data in comparison 
with the previous time period. First, the general relationship 
between changes in homicide and changes in our economic indicators 
I 
declined. Second, for the homicide of black females, their responses 
to changes in the economy during the 1920s were negative while during 
the Great Depression the responses in their homicide rates were random 
or very slight. Third, for the homicide of black males we find a 
reversal of the coefficients from one time period to another. Their 
2 
r coefficient remains basically the same for both time periods, 
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although during the 1920s black male homicide rates were positively 
related to the economy while during the 1930s the homicide rates were 
negatively related to our economic variables. 
In order to deepen our understanding of the similarities and 
differences in our data for the two times periods, it is important to 
briefly describe the socioeconomic conditions of the Great Depression. 
Historically, the Great Depression began on October 29, 1929 with 
the crash of the Wall Street stock market. Many factors contributed 
to the initial collapse of the market and subsequent deterioration of 
the economy. The "era of prosperity" of the 1920s was a precariously 
flawed prosperity which contained elements of chronic unemployment, 
depressed agricultural conditiqns, uneq~al distributions of wealth and 
increasing consumer debt. As early as 1925 automotive production and 
other areas of industrial manufacturing began to decline due to over-
production and increasingly large surpluses of goods which the major-
ity of the population could ill-afford to purchase. Only corporate 
profits (due to price increases and speculation) prevented many 
industrial concerns from feeling these early declines in productivity 
(while corporate profits rose 65 percent from 1923 to 1929 wages only 
increased 11 percent; Hacker, 1949). 
The initial political and economic response to the onset of the 
Depression was to view it as a temporary "cyclic" adjustment of the 
economy which, as on previous occasions, would soon ameliorate itself 
naturally according to the laws of economics and might, very well, 
even be beneficial for the economy in the long run. Since the 
political administration had been traditionally tied to a laissez-
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faire economic theorj, what few attempts were made by the government to 
aid economic conditions were insufficient to the task. Instead, 
appeals were made for voluntaristic aid for those who were suffering 
from economic deprivation. These efforts were soon overwhelmed by 
the intensity and extent of the depression; by 1932, for example, the 
Red Cross in Illinois could only allocate seventy-five cents a week 
per needy family on their rolls. The height of the Great Depression 
manifested itself in 1932-1933 when 37 percent of the civilian non-
farm labor force (approximately 15 million individuals) were unem-
ployed (an excellent account--both statistical and anecdotal regarding 
the effects of the Depression on individual lives can be found in 
Dubofsky, Theoharis and Smith, 1978). 
Although the lower-working class was the earliest affected by the 
Great Depression, the middle-class and professionals were hit more 
traumatically by the economic adversity (Dubofsky, Theoharis and 
Smith, ibid.). The working classes had long experienced the fluctu-
ations of unemployment which existed during the 1920s. Psychologic-
ally, there was the knowledge that the "era of prosperity" only inter-
mittently, if not at all, included them and had sufficient experience 
in contending with the trials of seasonal, technological and cyclical 
unemployment. Middle-class America found itself in psychological 
disarray having been promulgated on the concept of "never ending 
prosperity" and then finding themselves unemployed and indigent. 
These individuals, raised on the values of individual competition and 
achievement now found themselves subject to economic forces beyond 
their control (or understanding) and subject to dependency upon 
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voluntaristic social service agencies for their economic survival. As 
Dubofsky, et. al. points out, "LT/he first three full years of the. 
depression--1930 through 1932--witnessed fewer strikes and industrial 
disputes than the last year of prosperity, 1929. Indeed the prosperous 
years from 1923 through 1926 experienced 50 percent more industrial 
conflict than did the early depression years" (p. 213) • 
For the rural areas, which had experienced a chronic recession 
throughout the 1920s, the Great Depression presented an economic coup 
de grace for many farmers. Initially, those wiped out by the crash 
were mostly white tenant farmers and black sharecroppers who began 
migrating in search of economic sustenance. As conditions worsened 
toward 1932, farmers in Iowa, ~ebraska and the Dakotas attempted to 
prevent food products from going into the market in order to raise 
prices. Other such direct action movements spread to Minnesota, 
Wisconsin and Illinois leading to unrest and violence. 
Foreclosures on homes and.farms increased drastically as the 
national income in 1933 approached only half of what it had been in 
1929. However, these foreclosures provided little relief for the 
banks since no market existed for the sale of these properties. With 
loan defaults increasing numerous banks passed into insolvency. This 
stimulated even more panic and bank runs which eventually led to 
individual states declaring bank holidays. By March of 1933, 
scarcely a bank remained open in the United States. 
As conditions increasingly worsened, the urban unemployed began 
marches and riots in various cities such as New York, Cleveland and 
Detroit. Clashes with police became more common and frequently 
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resulted in deaths. In the Spring of 1932 World War I veterans formed 
a "Bonus Army" and marched with their families on Washington. \'lith 
drawn sabres, torches and tear gas they were routed out by real army 
troops. 
Much urban violence was stimulated by the resurgence of the 
nearly defunct labor movement. Union membership increased from 2.85 
million in 1933 to 8.94 million by 1940. In the same period the 
average annual number of strikes was never below 1,700 with a high of 
4,740 in the recession years of 1937. The violence of these strikes 
peaked in 1934 when strikers battled militia, police and national 
guard troops in Toledo, San Francisco and ttinneapolis-St. Paul. The 
initial alienation which the workers experienced at the start of the 
Depression began to dissipate as a decade of high unemployment and 
minimal economic opportunity began to stimulate a class consciousness 
(Bakke, 1940). 
The effect of the Great Depression on family life was both 
positive and negative. In one respect the problems of unemployment 
and lost savings diminished the authority of the husband and father. 
In the lower middle-classes the losses of mortgages and savings 
deprived older people of the funds they hoped to depend on for their 
later y~ars (Hacker and Zahler, 1952). Many households experienced 
father absence as the male heads migrated in search of work. 
Although female participation in the working world increased from 
19~0 to 1940, its rate was lower than for the three preceding decades 
as explicit attempts were made to exclude them from the labor force. 
In a more positive sense, there is evidence to suggest that in many 
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cases the Depression brought families together more as the home became 
the center of activity. Juvenile delinquency actually declined during 
this period as unemployed fathers were forced to remain at home for 
long periods (Maller, 1936; Lynds, 1937; Sanders and Exell, 1937, 
Wiers, 1945) • 
To begin, those individuals who initially experienced the greatest 
trauma from the Depression were those in the middle-classes and pro-
fessional classes. These individuals would be less apt to commit 
homicide as a response to their absolute deprivation (Breed, 1962; 
Maris, 1967; Lalli and Turner, 1968; Henry and Short, 1954). In con-
trast, the lower-classes, who had experienced chronic fluctuations in 
unemployment throughout the 1920s and were more familiar with means of 
adaptation, experienced a comparative substantial increase in socio-
economic status in relation to the middle-classes. Hence, the rich 
are no longer getting richer but instead are feeling the destitution 
of the lower-classes. As the Depression progressed, a greater mili-
tancy grew among the working-classes which did not exist during the 
1920s. Violence was still other-directed but tended to manifest 
itself in the form of riots, strikes and protest movements (Dubofsky, 
et. al., op. cit.). It should also be noted that the period of the 
1930s resulted in a greater distribution of wealth. While a total 
economic equality did not occur, a greater amount was distributed 
downward than during the laissez-faire period of the 1920s (Dubofsky, 
op. cit.). This could also aid the working-classes in terms of a 
perceived increase in status. It has been noted that lover and 
domestic homicides increased during the Depression. Much of these 
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might be attributed to the presence at horne of unemployed males whose 
families experienced economic stress. According to Stauffer and · 
Lazarsfeld (1937) chronic unemployment served to denegrade the father's 
authority and self-esteem within the familial household, especially in 
those situations where children were present or the wife was able to 
secure employment. For this reason, many industries, particularly 
government service, attempted to explicitly reduce or prohibit female 
employment (Hacker and Zahler, op. cit.). 
In looking at our data, we find the highest homicide r 2 for white 
males (r2 = .70) while the homicide change r 2 coefficient for black 
males is .53. This finding contradicts Henry and Short who found 
that black males had higher homicide coefficients than did their white 
counterparts. Statistically since our model is based on the correla-
tions of changes in rates and not absolute values, we can state that 
white male homicides were more sensitive to negative changes in the 
economy than were black male homicide rates. Relative to the social 
status position of the blacks, white males experienced a greater 
absolute deprivation with the decline in the economy while blacks 
experienced a relative increase in status (race aside, both groups 
now suffered from unemployment). However, as economic conditions 
began to improve, white workers fared better than black workers 
(especially black males) so that the blacks then suffered a cornpara-
tive loss of status. 
Returning to the analysis of our data, we should note (contrary 
to Brenner) that despite the economic upheaval of the period, homi-
cide rates tended to actually decline during the Depression period 
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(Zahn, 1980). After reaching its peak in 1933, homicide rates declined 
annually until the end of the Depression. Various studies also indi-
cate that during this period the nature of homicide also tended to 
change. With the repeal of prohibition, homicides related to the 
notorious beer wars no longer occurred. Thus, while homicides related 
to organized crime diminished, domestic and love-related homicides 
increased in their importance (Wolfgang, 1958; Boudouris, 1970). While 
the decline_jn organized crime related homicide rates may partially 
explain the lower coefficients we find for the Depression period, we 
must still try and explain the coefficients and relationships as they 
exist for our other aggregate categories. 
Even more interesting ara the directionalities of the black 
female homicides. Although the multiple -r square is relatively low 
(r2 = .19) the homicide trends are opposite from all of our other 
aggregate categories. That is, changes in our black female homicide 
rates are positively related to changes in our economic indicators. 
Although the size of the coefficient indicates a relative insensi-
tivity to changes in the economy, it is important if we compare it 
with the black female suicide rates and their relationship to economic 
change. The black female suicide coefficient for the 1930s was the 
2 highest for our aggregate categories (r = .71) and only equaled by 
2 
the white male category (r = .71). This lends credence to our pre-
viously stated positions that given the greater labor force partici-
pation of the black female versus her black male counterparts, a 
radical decline in the economy would result in not only an absolute 
economic loss but also a drop in status within their racial grouping. 
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This is a salient point which Henry and Short failed to consider. 
Namely, during the pre-war historical period, among whites, males ·had 
a higher economic status than females while among blacks, females had 
a higher economic status than the males. The fact that black males 
2 
'have the lower suicide sensitivity for this period (r = .30) would 
indicate that their absolute or economic loss was not so great given 
the fact tl~t they had the highest unemployment rate of this period 
to begin with. If anything, as we stated above, they may have a 
status increase relative to their white male counterparts. Thus, 
going back to our findings regarding the black female homicide rate of 
this period, as economic conditions improved after the initial shock 
of the early 1930s, black males would begin to suffer from relative 
deprivation as black females began to enter the working labor force 
again. This could possibly explain the findings for the positive 
relationship between black female homicides and changes in our 
economic indicators. However, due to the low level of our coeffi-
cient such an explanation could only be considered quite tentative. 
In terms of white suicides for this period a somewhat similar 
situation occurs but with a sex reversal. White males had the highest 
suicide coefficient (r2 = .71) with a negative directionality between 
suicide and economic changes. Again we could attribute this to the 
absolute loss experienced at the onset of the Great Depression. The 
fact that the white male coefficient is more than twice that of the 
black male coefficient would indicate that the white male suicide 
rate was much more sensitive to negative changes in the economy than 
was the black male suicide rate of change. An implication of this is 
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that upper-status individuals (regardless of race or sex) have more to 
lose or gain in radically fluctuating economies. 
2 The increase in the white female suicide coefficient (r = ,60) 
from that of the 1920s can be explained in various ways. First, 
experience of absolute and relative deprivation as they or their 
spouses experience some of the more malevolent effects of the Great 
Depression, e.g., loss of income due to unemployment, loss of finan-
cial assets, foreclosure of property, loss of status, etc. These 
financial hardships, especially when coupled with having to raise a 
family can create a great deal of stress and anguish. Second, feel-
ings of frustration for white females were probably exacerbated by 
government and business policies of the period not to hire females for 
job positions and to give males job priorities. This was based on the 
assumption that males needed job positions to a greater degree in 
order to support their families. Since the 1920s was a period of 
increasing female participation in the labor force (Dubofsky, et. al., 
op. cit.) the above situation was not only sexually discriminating but 
could also lead to feelings of relative deprivation. It should be 
noted that female suicides peaked in 1937 while male suicides peaked 
in 1932 (Vital Statistics of the u.s.). This corresponds to our data 
that males (especially white males) were more susceptible to changes 
in the economy than were white females (this cannot apply to black 
2 females since their r was the same as white males) • 
Sununary 
1930-1941 
The period of the Great Depression was characterized by drastic 
unemployment, poverty and social turmoil. Despite the severity of 
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these conditions, we found a substantial decline in our coefficients 
for this period. This was despite the fact that two additional 
economic variables were added to our equation. 
For both suicide and homicide the relationship between their 
annual changes with the changes of our economic variables was negative. 
Changes in white male and black female suicide rates were most sus-
ceptible to the changes in our economic variables. In terms of changes 
in the homicide rates, the coefficients were highest for white males 
and black males with white males showing a higher r 2 than their black 
counterparts. Although their coefficients were much lower, white and 
black female homicides exhibited the same type of relationship with 
each other as did the males. ~hese findings contradicted Henry and 
Short who postulated that black homicide coefficients would be higher 
than white coefficients. 
THE POST-WAR ERA 
(194 7 -1974) 
In looking at our post-World War II data we notice a general 
decline in our coefficients from our pre-war data (Table 5) • What is 
equally interesting is that, compared to the pre-war period, the 
directionality of the relationship between homicide and the economy 
changed. During the pre-war period negative changes in the economy 
generally resulted (with a few exceptions) in positive changes in our 
aggregate homicide rates. No~we find that changes in the homicide 
rates are positively related to changes in the economy. For our sui-
cide data we find a similar (but weaker) set of relationships as 
existed in the pre-war period, i.e., negative changes in the economy 
generally resulted in positive changes in suicide (again with a few 
exceptions). Thus, at least for this post-war period Brenner's 
analysis appears correct. 
Our homicide coefficients for this period indicate that white 
males and females are more sensitive to positive changes in the 
economy with white females being more sensitive than white males. 
Although their coefficients are lower, a similar pattern exists 
between black males and females. It appears, therefore, that black 
homicide rates are not as susceptible to changes in the economy as 
are the white homicide rates. 
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In terms of our suicide data, males (white and black) exhibit 
the greatest sensitivity to negative changes in the economy. Black 
and white females show little or no sensitivity to changes in the 
economy although their coefficients for our individual economic vari-
ables are consistently negative. 
Post-~'1ar Plots 
Our plots (17-32) for this period may better illustrate some of 
the relationships which exist between. our variables. These plots 
differ somewhat from our previous ones in that rather than looking at 
national unemployment rates for the total labor force, our dependent 
variables are being plotted aga~nst unemployment rates for each 
specific sexual-racial aggregate category. This was not done pre-
viously, since such group specific unemployment rates were not avail-
able until 1948. Our coefficients for the yearly changes in these 
unemployment rates with annual changes in our dependent variables can 
be found in Table 6. 
Our first pait of pl~ts for this period (Plots 17-18) illustrate 
the relationships between annual changes in white male suicide rates 
and industrial-manufacturing production and white mal~ unemployment. 
The coefficient between the yearly changes in these two variables is 
-.30 which indicates a fairly weak relationship relative to the pre-
war period (r = -.71). It should be noted that with the exception 
of seven time points, most of our white male suicides involved 
negative rates, i.e., the rates declined in more years than they 
increased. This indicates that during this period there were a 
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a greater number of years in which white male suicide rates declined 
from the previous year as compared to increasing. As can be discerned 
from the low level of our coefficient, the synchronicity of our 
variables is somewhat weak. Theoretically, white male homicides should 
decline when industrial-manufacturing production increases and vise-
versa. However, we find that in five time periods white male homi-
cides increased positively with our independent variable (1953, 1962, 
1965, 1968, 1972). In terms of unemployment and white male suicides 
we find a much stronger positive synchronization between annual flue-
tuations in our variables. This is exemplified in the correlation 
~ 
coefficient between these two variables (r = .67) • Certain notice-
able anomalies do exist, however. 
For example, from 1960 to 1961 white male unemployment increased 
while the suicide rates decreased. In 1961-1962 the exact reversal 
occurred. A similar negative relationship between the annual changes 
in our variables took place in 1966-1967, 1971-1972 and 1972-1973. 
These paradoxical shifts in the relationship between our variables 
most probably accounts for the diminution of our coefficient from its 
pre-war value. 
Plots 19 and 20 show the relationships between changes in 
industrial-manufacturing production, white female unemployment and 
white female suicides. Both our graphs and our coefficient tables 
indicate the weakness between changes in our variables. Although the 
coefficients for our independent variables and our dependent vari-
able (r = -.12 and .11 for industrial-manufacturing and white female 
unemployment respectively with white female suicide) are quite weak, 
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theoretically they are in the right direction However, given the over-
all weakness of our other economic variable coefficients with white 
female suicide (Table 5), it appears that the relationships between our 
variables are insignificant or random. 
Plots 21 and 22 illustrate the post-war relationships between 
annual changes in our two economic variables and black male suicides. 
As can be seen, there is no relationship of significance between 
yearly changes in industrial-manufacturing production and black male 
suicides (r = -.06). However, the relationship with black male 
unemployment and changes in black male suicides is stronger (r = .25) 
although still weak. 
Annual changes in black female suicide rates appear to be more 
closely related to our graphed economic variables than is her male 
counterpart (Plots 23 and 24). With changes in manufacturing produc-
tion we find a coefficient of -.25. Although weak, it is still 
theoretically in the right direction. What is interesting is that 
changes in black female suicides is more strongly related to changes 
in black female unemployment (r = .30). This is higher than the coef-
ficient between black female suicide and the total national unemploy-
ment rate (r = .18). While there appears to be little fluctuation in 
our suicide variable there is a relative degree of positive direc-
tionality between our variables prior to 1960. From then until 1966 
our variables exhibit a negative trend. This occurs again during the 
1962-1972 time period. 
In terms of changes in our homicide rates and their relationship 
with changes in our plotted economic variables, the coefficients are 
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very weak and almost suggest a random walk pattern. A possible 
exception to this is the homicides of black males (Plots 29-30) where 
the coefficient with black male unemployment is -.19. A point to 
note is the radical continuous yearly increase in black male homicides 
which occurs after 1963. The relationship with black male unemploy-
ment appears to be almost wholly nonexistent from then until 1974. 
In order to begin analysis of our findings and their relation-
ship to the major events of the post-war period we should look at 
some socioeconomic trends. Given the nature of our dependent vari-
ables and their possible relationship to various social, economic and 
political issues, we will begi~ pur exposition with the start of the 
Second World War. Although our research does not include data from 
this period it is best to start at that point in time in order to 
maintain historical continuity. 
With the beginning of the Second World War the American economy 
improved radically. Unemployment dropped from 14.6 percent of the 
labor force in 1940 to 9.9 percent in 1941. By 1944 the unemployment 
rate was only 1.2 percent. At the same time, homicide rates declined 
from 6.3 per 100,000 to 5.0. Suicides declined from a rate of 12.8 
(1941) to 10.0 (1944). These changes are, of course, related to the 
war effort. While the Second World War was unofficially ended with 
the surrender of the Japanese in 1945, President Truman did not 
officially announce the end of hostilities until December 31, 1946. 
In 1948 the Soviet Union began its blockade of Berlin, which ended a 
year later in May of 1949. At the same time, United States homicide 
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rates experienced a slight increase from 1945 to 1946 (5.7 to 6.4) 
only to begin a decline which extended to 1952. Suicides increased in 
1946 (11.5), stayed constant in 1947, declined in 1948 (11.2) and 
increased slightly again in 1949 (11.4). During the same period, 
unemployment rates rose from 1.9 in 1945 to 3.9 in 1946, stayed the 
same in 1947 and slightly declined- to 3.8 in 1948. However, 1949 saw 
a rise in unemployment to a 5.9 level (Historical Statistics of the 
United States. 
In 1950 the Korean Conflict began~ it ended with a truce finally 
signed in June, 1953. During this period unemployment rates declined 
from 5.3 in 1950 to 2.9 in 1953. Homicide rates were not susceptible 
to great changes during this period. While they declined from 1950 to 
1951 (5.3-4.9) they again increased in 1952 (5.2) only to decline 
again in 1953 (4.8). At this point the homicide rates levelled out 
and remained relatively constant until the early 1960s. Suicide rates 
declined from 11.4 in 1950 to 10.4 in 1951 and stayed relatively 
level at that point until the mid-1950s. The rest of the 1950s was 
generally a period of economic and technological growth. The unem-
ployment rate remained relatively stable with an average rate of 5.1 
(1954-1960). The only unusual increase occurred in the recession 
year of 1958 when unemployment rose to 6.8 from a previous 1957 rate 
of 4.3. 
Although there were no wars during this period (1954-1960), 
international political tensions were high as a "Cold War" existed 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Allied victory 
in the Second World War resulted in the United States becoming the 
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dominant world power in the post-war years. This was an unusual 
position for the United States given its strong pre-v1ar isolationi'sm. 
The development of effective nuclear capacity also added to the inter-
national tensions of the time. 
The nature of the American labor force changed during this period 
as the economy moved from emphasis on manufacturing-industrial pro-
duction to a post-industrial technological society (Bell, 1960). 
Work became more white-collar and service oriented as opposed to 
production oriented. More and more the "organization man" came to 
supplant the assembly-line worker. 
The 1960s issued in a period of social activism, protest move-
ments, and unfortunate mass violence in the form of riots, protests 
and political assassinations which extended into the early and mid-
1970s. The motivations for these movements were many--black equality 
and civil rights, feminist and women's rights, gay rights, the "hippie" 
movement with its value-free lifestyle, and last, but hardly the least 
in terms of termoil, the anti-war movement. 
In 1963 the United States began its involvement in what is now 
known as the Viet Nam War. The war reached its peak in 1967-1968 
(500,000 troops involved) and ended in defeat in 1973). This era was 
epitomized by the protests and more often than not, violent riots of 
anti-war organizations. Bombings, shooting, confrontations with 
police all contributed to a decade of domestic violence and tension. 
The intensity of these riots, demonstrations and acts of terror-
ism were quite profound. For example, it is estimated that over 
six million Americans were involved in some form of protest demonstra-
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tion or riot during this period. There were 350 deaths, 12,000 
reported injuries and nearly 100,000 arrests. Nearly 250 of the 
deaths were the result of racial violence and rioting. Practically 
every Northern city with large black populations experienced rioting, 
looting and the sizeable destruction of property (Gurr, 1979). It was 
during this period that the homicide rates began to drastically 
increase. Up until 1963 the rates still reflected those of the 1950s. 
In 1963 the rates began to increase reaching their peak in 1974 
(1963 = 4.5; 1975 = 9.7). Suicide rates for this same period remained 
relatively stable until 1969 when rates began to increase reaching 
their peak in 1974 (1969 = 11.1; 1974 = 13.7). 
In terms of the economy, Unemployment was at its top for the 
decade in 1961 (6.7 percent); it declined to a low of 3.5 in 1969 and 
then increased to 5.6 by 1974. Despite the employment fluctuations of 
this post-war period, it would appear that the economy progressed in a 
relatively steady and stable manner. There were no radical yearly 
fluctuations in the unemployment rates as existed during the 1920s 
and no Great Depression as there was during the 1930s. If anything, 
the post-war period was exemplified by relative prosperity and tech-
nological growth. 
Our data reveals that the homicide rates for white males (r2 = 
.66) and white females (r2 = .71) were most sensitive to positive 
changes in our economic indicators. If we can assume a time period 
of relatively prosperity, what category of individuals might be 
expected to be inclined to commit homicide? The relative depriva-
tion hypothesis would indicate that those most predisposed towards 
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homicide would be those individuals not sharing in the prosperity. , 
Boudouris (1971), Wolfgang (1958) and others have found that the 
nature of homicide changed in the immediate post-war period and into 
the 1950s. As opposed to the pre-war period, homicides were now 
either of a "domestic relations and lover" category or of a "friend 
and acquaintance" category. Generally the domestic relations and 
lover group involved, in most cases, the male killing his spouse 
(lover) or his spouse's lover. The friend and acquaintance category 
usually involved one male killing another over an argument (Zahn, 
1980). 
Tne trend in murder changed somewhat in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Block (1977) studied homicides ~in Chicago from 1965 to 1974 and found 
that not only did homicide rates in that period increase from 11.4 in 
1965 to 29.2 in 1974, but also that more homicides were being related 
to robbery. Although murders related to domestic feuds or arguments 
with friends still predominated, killings in the course of robbery 
were increasing. 
Given the above findings, the homicides for our white female 
aggregate category, could easily be seen as the result of domestic 
quarreling over finances or other problems the spouse may have in 
that regard (there are many physical and personality problems which 
can inhibit upward mobility during a prosperous period, e.g., alco-
holism, lack of skills or education, etc.). The literature abounds 
with research indicating that one of the major causes of marital 
conflict is financial difficulties. That such conflict can lead to 
homicide is not implausible. 
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For our white males, relative deprivation could easily lead to 
homicide, not only of their wives, but also of other males. Lalli and 
Turner (1968) found that most white male homicides occurred among 
semiskilled workers, common laborers and agricultural workers. These 
individuals would be quite susceptible to economic changes in an 
economy moving in a technological direction. In terms of robbery 
victims, given the limitations of our data, we are necessarily dis-
cussing a theoretical scenario. According to Block (1976) the 
increases in this mode of homicide occurs mostly among blacks. This 
point is crucial, since the most drastic increase in homicide rates 
for the post-war period was for black males and most of these homi-
cides were intraracial (Zahn, op. cit.). Yet, our coefficients indi-
cate that black male homicides are little affected by positive changes 
in the economy (r2 = .27). For the 1940s and 1950s period a possible 
explanation for our results may be that having been "frozen" outside 
of the mainstream of the American economy for so long, changes in the 
economy may have had little effect upon them. However, for the mid-
1960s and early 1970s, our data may reflect another phenomenon. That 
is, the return of young black Viet Nam veterans who had no marketable 
occupational skills but who were relatively well trained in violence. 
If we assume that black males are more predisposed to\~Tard the 
externalization of violence due to their past exploited social history 
(Henry and Short, op. cit.; Lalli and Turner, op. cit.),, participation 
in war (this is the first American war in which blacks assumed major 
combat roles) can direct and reinforce this predisposition towards 
aggression. If we add to this the frustration of unemployment and 
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the disdain shown black veterans due to the nation's widespread anti-
pathy towards the war, it is easy to see these men placing their 
martial skills into more violent directions. It should also be noted 
that (1) the Viet Nam war lasted for 11 years--longer than any other 
was in American history, and (2) it was not a "regular" war but rather 
a war in which the military tactics involved every form of "dirty" 
killing imaginable, and (3) there is considerable evidence of exten-
sive drug a~use among the United States military personnel in Viet 
Nam. These factors combined to create a very volatile situation for 
those returning to the United States. That blacks and lower-class 
whites were overrepresented in U.S. combatant forces in Viet Nam is a 
point reiterated in the liberal media. It is feasible to assume that 
upon returning to the u. s. many of these men could turn to violent 
crime (Lifton, 1970; Archer and Gartner, 1976; Gurr, 1979). 
The homicides of black females might be attributed to a situa-
tion similar to that of white females. This might be especially so 
beginning in·~~e early 1960s when the black male unemployment rate 
began to decline (much probably due to the large number of blacks 
going into military service). Despite the decrease in black unem-
ployment rates at this time, there were still many black unemployed 
males suffering from relative deprivation, since many of their 
compatriots found work (black male unemployment reached a low of 5.3 
in 1969--the lowest it had been since 1953, (Historical Statistics 
of the United States, p. 135). It is feasible, therefore, that many 
of these men, experiencing relative deprivation, may have taken their 
frustrations out on their spouses, especially if the spouses were 
employed. 
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During the period prior to 1964, black females generally showed 
lower unemployment rates than their male counterparts. Thus, a 
similar situation of black male relative deprivation could have taken 
place. Especially in a social environment in which (almost like the 
1920s) prosperity and technological growth exemplified the atmosphere 
of the times. Despite our theoretical specuations, these r 2 coeffi-
cients are low. Undoubtedly there exist other factors contributing 
to changes in these aggregate categories' homicide rates. For that 
matter, these other factors probably explain more of the variance in 
the rate of homicide change (especially for black males) than our 
economic indicators do. 
2 In terms of our suicide r~sults, the r s for white males and 
black males are .54 and .34 respectfully. The relationship between 
changes in their suicide rates and our economic indicators is negative. 
Lalli and Turner (op. cit.) found that for white males, suicides 
generally occur in the lower occupational status categories to a 
larger degree than in the upper status categories. For black males 
the suicide rates were pretty evenly distributed across occupational 
categories. Others researchers such as Gibbs and Porterfield (op. 
cit.) and Breed (op. cit.) related status-loss as being a major vari-
able for male suicides. Looking at our data for white males, the high 
coefficient between changes in suicide rates and changes in unemploy-
ment would not seem to indicate individuals who were chronically unem-
played (they would not be so sensitive to such rates) but mostly males 
whose occupations may be most susceptible to increasing unemployment, 
i.e., semiskilled workers, clerical, sales, etc. These individuals 
are generally employed during "good" times but are the first "to go" 
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when business conditions warrant it--even if the overall nature of the 
economy is not that bad. In this situation, the individual will suffer 
both relative and absolute deprivation. Relative deprivation would 
come from not having a job when others do. Absolute deprivation would 
come from the obvious absolute loss of income and means of liveli-
hood. What seems to give substance to this interpretation is that, 
for white males, there were no radical periods of rapidly expanding 
rates of unemployment in this period nor were there exceptional yearly 
fluctuations in the rates. This is not to say that there was no 
unemployment or annual fluctuations in the rate. Rather, we take the 
position that in a changing economy, such as the move from a blue-
collar production oriented economy to a service oriented post-indus-
trial economy taking place during this period certain occupational 
categories would be more sensitive to even slight increases in unem-
ployment rates. 
Turning to black male suicide rates, it is surprising that the 
coefficient is so low (r2 = .34). For black males, the low unemploy-
ment rates of this period certainly did not apply to them. In 1948 
their unemployment rate was a modest 5.8, increasing to 9.6 and 9.4 
for 1949 and 1950, then decreasing to 4.9 5.2 and 4.8 (1951, 1952, 
1953 respectively). In 1954 it jumped to 10.3, declined slightly for 
the next three years, and then in 1958 rose to 13.8 where it remained 
above 10 percent until 1964. It began a decline after that (probably 
due to war conscription and service) and only began to increase in 
1970. Given not only the high level of black male unemployment but 
also the radical fluctuations of these rates over time, it is no 
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surprise that their r coefficient for this time period is higher than 
during the Great Depression. 
In terms of black male suicides for this period we see two 
possible explanations--none of which are mutually exclusive. The 
first possibility involved the concept of fatalism. One of our more 
interesting findings is that changes in the black male suicide rates 
are more highly correlated with annual changes in black female unem-
ployment rates than with their own (r = .34 and .24 respectively). 
This correlation is even higher than found for black female suicides 
(r = .30) with their own unemployment rates. We have pointed out 
above that black female participation in the labor force is generally 
greater and more "secure" than for the black male (black female 
unemployment rates did not fluctuate so drastically during this time 
period) • For a black male to be unemployed in an economy "'hich is 
basically prosperous and growing is certainly a form of relative depri-
vation especially if one's female counterpart is still employed. How-
ever, if one's spouse or female counterpart is also unemployed during 
such an economic period, then a form of fatalism can occur •. If it is 
bad enough that a black male cannot provide an income for his house-
hold during "good" economic times, how much worse must it be if his 
spouse is also unemployed? A second point for consideration involves 
competition for work. Black female unemployment means that more 
individuals will be competing in the job market. Since not all 
black female job positions strictly involve domestic or secretarial-
clerical positions, we can assume that under conditions of high black 
female unemployment many black females will be competing with black 
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males for semiskilled job positions (at probably a lower rate of 
wages) making it even more difficult for the black male to attain-a 
job position. Thus, the black male's financial position becomes even 
more desperate and frustrating. A second possibility involves the 
frustration of rising expectations. The frustration of rising 
expectations occurs when unemployment rates shift in a radical direc-
tion on an annual basis. 
For example, if unemployment rates fluctuate_around 5 percent 
for three years (1951-1953)and then doubles to 10.3 percent (1954) in 
one year, we.can assume that many rising expectations were shattered. 
Related to this is the moderately high negative coefficient between 
changes in personal savings ( r = -.36) and changes in black male 
suicides. Swanson and Breed, in one of the few studies conducted on 
black suicides, investigated suicides in New Orleans covexing 
the years 1954-1963. Over 40 percent of their black male suicides 
were attributed to financial difficulties (as compared to 19 percent 
for white male suicides in New Orleans, covering the same· period). 
This was despite the fact that all of these black males were employed 
at the time of their suicide. The authors also bring up an inter-
esting point in that while the white males viewed their jobs in terms 
of occupational prestige and status, the black males viewed their 
jobs as a means to attain a financial income and cared little about 
the status implications. What is significant regarding this study 
for our purposes is that 34 percent of their black male suicides had 
experienced a downward trend in income for the two years prior to 
their suicides. Thus, it was not so much as issue of "status loss" 
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for these men as much as a progressive income loss. It should be noted 
that it was during this time period that black unemployment was at. its 
highest peak (1954-1963) • Coupling these two concepts--economic fatal-
ism and relative deprivation--it is easy to understand the black male 
suicide rate for this period. 
In terms of our black female suicides, it first appears that the 
coefficients are so low as to indicate little or no relationship 
between our variables. However, if we substitute black female unemploy-
2 
ment rates for the national total rates, we find that the r rises 
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considerably (r = .22). Thus we see that changes in black female 
unemployment rates are an important variable in terms of black female 
suicides. Since black females participate in the labor force to a 
greater extent than black males, the economic stability of their house-
holds depended to a great extent on continued work. Radical fluctua-
tions in unemployment can lead to anxiety over future financial and 
occupational prospects and a frustration of rising expectations. 
Regarding our white female suicides, both our plots and coeffi-
cients show little or no relationship between our variables. It 
would be extremely tenuous for us to posit any explanation for this, 
especially since the motives for suicide are extremely diverse and 
very subjective to the victim. 
If we have appeared somewhat reticent in our analysis of the 
post-war data it is because this period involved many qualitative 
changes which go beyond our quantitative economic measures. This 
time period of 28 years included two major American wars--Korea and 
Viet Nam. These wars consumed 15 years of our 28. As Archer and 
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Cartner (op. cit.) point out, the effect of war on one of the partici-
pant nations certainly not only institutes changes in that society. but 
may also change its normative structure. Violence can certainly become 
legitimated--now more than ever, given the instantaneous media pre-
sentation of war front events. A second point which may have influ-
enced our data, especially during the 1960s and early 1970s, were the 
riots and extreme violence associated with the various social move-
ments of the time, e.g., black riots, anti-war riots, assassinations, 
bombings, etc. How much of this was the result of an unpopular war 
the result of pressures which had built up over time is beyond the 
scope of this research. However, if a foreign war can have the effect 
of legitimating personal violence in the homeland, we may assume that 
the synchronous viol·ence of social movements within the homeland may 
exacerbate the diminution of personal inhibitions against violence as 
a means to attain personal ends. 
Zahn (op. cit.) posits a third problem--the rise of a drug cul-
ture. If our homicide data for the 1920s was confounded by the notor-
ious "beer wars" of the period, how much are we confounded by the 
homicides resulting from the insidious machinations and conflicts of 
the drug merchants? If not the drug merchants then it is their 
clients who must financially support them (Noble, 1977, claims that 
the recent increase in crime is predominantly due to illegal drug 
users who must' finance their dependency). The relationship between 
alcoholism and suicide is well known. How many more suicides can be 
attributed to drug-abuse? 
A fourth point relates to the exhibition of violence on the mass 
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media, e.g., television. While American society has historically 
tolerated and even condoned violent behavior, it is first in this. 
time period that extensive violence has been visually shown to mass 
audiences. The psychological effects of exposure to violence have been 
well documented (Report to the Surgeon General, 1972). Responses 
include imitative behavior and a numbing of the senses regarding aggres-
sive behavior. Janowitz (1979) describes riot situations during the 
1960s where extensive media coverage either inadvertently aided or 
encouraged looting and other forms of violent street behavior. 
A fifth point involves demographic shifts in the age structure of 
the population during the 1960s. Most violent crimes are committed by 
males in the 19-29 age category. It was during this time period that 
the post-World War II "baby boom" generation came into its adolescence 
and young adulthood. This change in the a·ge structure of our society 
contributed greatly to the increase in crime rates for this period 
(Skogan, 1979). As this generation increased in age into the 1970s, 
the crime rates tended to decrease. 
Sixth and finally, there has occurred a substantial increase in 
the suicide rates of white male adolescents and young adults {15-24) 
beginning in 1965 (9.6 with a peak of 17.8 in 1974). Studies have 
shown that these unfortunate youngsters come primarily from the mid-
and upper-classes. Correlations with economic indicators would 
probably shed little light on their personal dilemmas. 
Much more could probably be said about the qualitative condi-
tions of our society during this time period. However, we feel that 
the above sampling is sufficiently representative of the many social 
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conditions and problems which elude the theoretical model of this 
research. 
Summary 
Post-War Years 
Our post-World War II data showed a drastic decline in our coeffi-
cients from the pre-war period. A second noticeable difference is in 
the directionality of the relationship between our homicide variables 
and economic change. During the pre-war period the relationship was 
negative. Our post-war data indicates the opposite. Changes in homi-
cide rates are now positively correlated with changes in the economy. 
Looking at our aggregate groups we found that white males and females 
suicide rates show a greater sensitivity to economic changes than do 
black males and females with the male coefficients being higher than 
the female. In terms of homicides, the female coefficients are higher 
than the male coefficients for this time period. 
Socioeconomically, the immediate post-war years were a period of 
prosperity and relative tranquility. The 1960s issued in a period of 
social unrest epitomized by rioting, violent demonstrations and the 
Viet Nam War. It was also during this decade that homicide rates 
increased drastically as did suicide rates among the young. We 
attributed the post-war decline in our coefficients as being due to 
the various non-economic social conditions which took place at this 
time. 
SUl1L'1ARY AND CONCLUSION 
The relationship between society and the individual is a unique 
one. That is, while certain aspects of societal norms and values 
abide in all of us; socialization is never perfect. Deviant behavior, 
as Dur~~eim 90inted out, is a fact of social life. However, the exact 
relationship between societal conditions and individual behavior is a 
problematic one. ~11ile we all live in society and depend upon societal 
norms to reinforce our role behavior and expectations, norms and values 
do change. Concomitant with this is the individual's ability to 
adhere to internalized norms or attain social goals or values. \~1en 
social change occurs and norms are put "to the test" so to speak, 
individual frustration will also occur. For some individuals, the 
internalization or externalization of aggression becomes the pri~ary 
means for adaptation. 
The purpose of our research •.vas to basically test and replicate 
the Henry and Short study of socioeconomic change a~d its relationship 
to homicide and suicide. Using a model of first differences for the 
years 1919-1941 and 1946-1974 we attempted to analyze what effect yearly 
absolute changes in various economic variables ~ay have had on con-
comitant changes in race and sex specific homicide and suicide rates. 
Henry and Short as well as others, e.g., Harvey Brenner, found that 
over time suicide tended to increase during economic recessions while 
homicides increased during 9eriods of economic prosperity. 
Both of the above authors make use of the conce.:;>ts of "relative 
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J.eprivation," or "absolute deprivation," or "the frustration of rising 
expectations". as mediating variables to explain vlhy individuals in 
certain social categories resort to violent behavior during periods 
of economic prosperity or recession. Henry and Short also utilize the 
perspective of internal versus external social constraints. These con-
straints are based upon one's social position in society and the type 
of socialization which is practiced at that level. Thus, individuals 
in "upper" status positions are subject to internal constraints and are 
more apt to commit suicide \>hile "lower" status individuals are sutject 
to high external constraints and are therefore prone tm•?ard homicidal 
behavior. l·:hile Henry and Short felt that their data substantiated 
their theoretical framework, other researchers, cited above, tend to 
disagree that this was wholly the case. Our own feeling tends to coin-
cide with these latter researchers to a greater or lesser degree. 
However, before presenting our own theoretical explanation for our 
findings, it is Lest that \·:e review sone of the basic trends in our data. 
If t:1ere is one overall trend in our data it is that dovmturns in 
the economy result in increases in the suicide rates over time. This 
long-term trend is especially strong for white males. For our other 
racial and sexual groups, the only discernable long-term trend is that 
our coefficients are higher for the pre-war period than for the post-
>1Tar era. 
In terms of homicides the pattern of relationships is somewhat 
different. Prior to ~·lorld iA/ar II changes in homicide rates were 
negatively related to changes in the economy. This finding held true 
for both the 1920s and the 1930s. In the 1920s the coefficients were 
higher for white males and females than for blacks. During the 1930s 
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the rates '\lere higher for males of either race than for females. Both 
sets of findings for these two time periods are contrary to Benry and 
Short's basic predictions and to Brenner's assumption that homicide is 
generally positively related to economic change except for certain 
Depression years (1929-1936) • 
These authors concluded from their research that the long-term 
trend in homicide is basically related to increases in economic pros-
perity. The pre-war deviation from this trend which they found in 
their data was ass~~ed to be strictly the result of the economic 
trauma of the early Depression period (1929-1936); Brenner, op. cit.). 
Thus, for these authors, reversals in the overall positive relation-
ship between homicide and prospe~ity could occur given certain severe 
declines in the economy. 
In terms of specific social groupings, changes 'in homicide rates 
for all of our time periods were generally more strongly related to 
changes in the economy for white males and females (the only exception 
being during the 1930s when the coefficients were highest for both 
t'lhite and black males). 
t~ile the above describes the basic trends we are able to discern 
in our data, it does little to explain these trends. Our data indicates 
that economic conditions do influence changes in suicide and homicide 
rates. However, for these conditions to influence such highly volatile 
and personal acts, mediating factors must surely exist. 
We agree with Brenner and Henry and Short that socioeconomic change 
can lead to stress, frustration and forms of deprivation, we also feel 
that our data indicates some other salient points. If, as DurkheL~ 
pointed out, social change can be either quantitative, as in terms of 
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rapid and radical fluctuations in the economy, or qualitative, as in 
terms of changes in value structures and belief s'lstems, then either of 
ti1at t>·lO types of societal changes--either separately or in combination, 
can lead to anomie and increases in deviant behavior (Hinkle, op. cit). 
Given this, it is reasonable to assume that the particular type of 
social which occurs will vary over time in any particular society. 
Assuming t~1at this is true, then each historical time period may have to 
be examined for its own "unique" social change characteristics. 
For example, an analysis of our data shows the decade of the 
1920s as having t.~e highest quantitative relational coefficients between 
our variables. A visual examination of our plots for this same period 
shows a great deal of concomitant variability from year to year. That 
is, there were radical yearly fluctuations in both the economy and 
homicide and suicide. 
Thus, not only was the 1920s a period of great qualitative changes 
'J 
(described in ANALYSIS OF DATA (p. 37) but also extreme yearly quanti-
tative changes • The period of the 1930s exhibited radical initial 
economic change (1930-1933) which was matched by our dependent yariables. 
However, subsequent years did not indicate the closeness in the annual 
changes in our variables as was found during the decade of the 1920s. 
Our plots indicate that while economic conditions were bad throughout 
the decade, it was only the initial shock of the first few years of the 
Depression which apparently stimulated the greatest amount of reactive 
violence. Thus, it would appear that during this period an initial 
massive quantitative change at the beginning of the decade (and to a lesser 
degree during the 1937-1938 recession year) had the greatest influence 
on our coefficients. Again, both our homicide and suicide coefficients 
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'"ere negative 'Vlith the economy. 
During the post-".·Jar period ':Je see a decline in our coefficients 
as well as a reversal of the relational trend for homicide. A look at 
our plots shows little annual variability for our variables at least 
during the decade of the 1950s·. During the 1960s variability increases 
for both our dependent and independent variables. Yet, there is little 
if any relationship between homicide and unemployment or industrial-
manufacturing production. Thus, for the post~var period we find one 
decade in which there were minor annual fluctuations in our variables 
and a second decade in which there were radical fluctuations but with 
little or no relationship between the variables. Given our implicit 
notion that anomie social change may be quantitative or qualitative, 
rapid and radical or slow and mundane depending upon the historical 
period in question, it would appear that the post-war period initially 
exhibited little quantitative or qualitative change for our variables. 
During the 1960s, the social and economic changes which occurred were 
both quantitatively and qualitatively radical with our quantitative 
economic variables seeming to have little effect (with certain excep-
tions) on changes in the homicide and suicide rates. 
For example, a look at our plots indicates that there were 
extreme yearly fluctuations in both our economic and non-economic vari-
ables for the period from 1960 on. However, these changes were not con-
comitant with each other and thus did not result in a strong quantita-
tive relationship. The only reasonable explanatory assumption we can 
make from our data and a historical analysis of the times is that the 
qualitative changes 'Vlhich occurred, e.g., the Viet Narn War, the urban 
riots, the various social movements etc., had a greater influence on 
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changes in l1omicides and suicides than did changes in the econorn~r. 
r;?e noted that there Here certain exceptions to the above post_-war 
trends and this brings us to the second point in our discussion. i:-larnely, 
the differential susceptibility of various subgroups in our society to 
the positive or negative effects of economic change. \~e have seen 
that different aggregate groups show a greater or lesser suicide-homi-
cide sensitivity relative to economic change depending u~on the time 
period in question. \'ihile we agree tvith the theoretical notions of 
relative and absolute deprivation and the frustration of rising expecta-
tions and have utilized these concepts extensively to explain our otvn 
findings, they do have relatively subjective notions. As Lester and 
Lester (1971, 1975) point out, in order to fully be able to utilize the 
concepts of relative or absolute deprivation we should kno'·" vlhich 
criteria groups the individuals committing hor:1icide or suicide are 
referencing themselves with. For example, is a black male '.Vho is 
unemployed and co~~its homicide or suicide ex9eriencing relative depri-
vation· vis-a-vis t-;hites '"ho are employed, his wife 1-vho might be employed 
or other black males who are employed? Ot, might he be reacting to all 
three groups and individuals? Ne feel this is a significant issue which 
is yet to be adequately researched. One possible approach, if ,,,e accept 
that negative economic change is related to homicide and suicide, is to 
examine a subgroup's position within the labor force. Since the job 
market changes over time, certain groups of individuals t·till exhibit a 
greater or lesser vulnerability to negative economic conditions. 
Ahlburg and Schapiro (op. cit), in looking at white male suicide and 
unemployment, for example, J:-..ave shown that not only >vas suicide related 
to unemployment, but also to the expectations an individual has regard-
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ing his or her accessibility to the labor force. This, they felt, i'las 
in turn related to the size of the age cohorts beginning to enter into 
the labor market. \f.'lile we find this model appealing and that it could 
probably apply to homicide as well as suicide, we feel that such vari-
ables as an individual job skills and personal abilities must also be 
considered. However, these variables are more difficult to quantify and 
often times can only be surmised. 
An additional point i.vhich should be considered in this context is 
the increase in female participation within the labor force during the 
post-war period. vfuat effect, if any, does this have on homicide and 
suicide rates? While we found that positive changes in unemployment 
(i.e., increases) lead to increases in male suicide, the same economic 
variable has little or no effect on female suicides. In terms of homi-
cides, post-war changes in this variable are moderately related to 
positive changes in the economy, i.e., female homicides tend to increase 
with prosperity. 
How can we explain these findings? At best we can only surmise. 
With regards to female suicide, although there has been an extensive 
increase in female participation in the labor force and a greater empha-
sis on female "careerism" as a means to attain personal growth and satis-
faction, the residuals of traditional sex-role socialization may not as 
yet allow females to view the loss of employment with the same psycho-
logical and emotional inten~ity as males do. Thus, as some researchers 
point out (Ritzer, 1977; Garson, 1~82) many women in the work force may 
be viewing their occupations as a means to an end as opposed to males 
who consider it an end in itself. Of course, as time progresses and 
women continue to participate in the labor force at every level, we 
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should theoretically assume that their suicide rates \·lill become more 
negatively related to the economy than in the past. 
In terms of female homicides, again we are limited to theoretical 
assumptions. Given that female homicides are generally committed by 
males and that the nature of homicide has changed over the last few 
decades, '"'e can assume that much, if not most, female homicides involve 
some form of domestic conflict. Since, as we pointed out above, males 
are more effected psychologically by neqative changes in the economy, 
it sea~s feasible to assume that many males may feel the frustration of 
relative deprivation if they are unemployed while their female counter-
parts (e.g., spouses or lovers) are emplo~ed. This situation can become 
exacerbated especially if female participation in the labor market is 
viewed as a competition for scarce job positions. Among certain segr.ents 
of our society such a situation can lead to domestic conflict and vio-
lence (c.f. Elder, 1984). 
tions: 
In summation, He \,'Ould like to reiterate sone of our basic observa-
1. 
.., 
... 
3. 
4. 
Changes in annual homicide and suicide rates exhibit a 
fluctuating sensitivity to changes in the economy depend-
ing u~on the r~storical period studied; 
Various racial and sexual subgroups exhibit a differen-
tial homicide-suicide susceptibility to changes in the 
economy depending upon the historical time period studied. 
The only long-term historically consistent relationship 
was between declines in t!"le economy and \,Thite male 
suicides; 
This uifferential susceptibility to economic chanqe by 
any particular racial-sexual subgroups may be due to 
that group's position and expectations regarding their 
accessibility to the job market; 
~fuile economic change, as measured by our model, 
appears to have a relative effect on changes in homicide 
and suicide rates, qualitative changes in society may 
have an even greater influence in deternining the levels 
of personal violence in society, depending upon the 
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historical period analyzed. 
It >·lould appear then that both quantitative and qualitative 
socioeconomic changes in society both influence the level of violence 
to be found. 
In those historical time periods when economic change predominates 
as a stimulant to personal violence, individuals may be differentially 
affected depending upon their occupational position within the society. 
In terms of future research >·le ~1ould like to suggest modifications 
of the model used in our research. First, additional independent vari-
ables should be looked at. For instance, changes in rural-urban popula-
tions might be included to determine how these influence homicide-sui-
cide rates over time. This might be beneficial especially with regards 
to homicide since certain theoretical perspectives relate types of 
homicides to rural-urban migrations. A second variable which miqht be 
included could be an educational level indicator. Education has long 
been an indicator of modernization and on the individual level a means 
for attaining job skills and upward social mobility. Negative changes 
in the economy should have its greatest psychological impact on those 
whose expectations for future occupational positions were high but who 
find themselves locked out of the job market. 
A second modification we would like to see attempted would be to 
look at each racial-sexual grouping broken down by age. Done over time, 
this would allow us to see which age categories were most sensitive, in 
terms of homicide and suicide, to fluctuations in the economy. Following 
the model of Ahlburg and Schapiro (op. cit,) this could allow us to see 
how changes in the age cohort structure might be reflected in changing 
homicide and suicide rates over time. We feel that these approaches 
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combined with aggregate studies such as those done by Breed (or. cit.) 
or Ru3hing (op. cit.) as well as individual case studies as suggested 
by Lester (op. cit.) for homicides, can provide us with a clearer 
picture as to what differentiates economic from noneconomic homicide 
and suicide. 
While our data indicates that not all homicides or suicides are 
necessarily related to economic change, we feel that there are certain 
social policies and programs which might be instituted in order to help 
those \'lho are effected by such changes. 
In terms of our dependent variables one basic approach might 
involve an increase in public knowledge regarding the psycr:ol0gical and 
inter:;?ersonal effects of job and income loss. Such information should 
be presented on the local co~~unity level--especially in those com-
munities most hurt by economic change. Various community organizations 
and church groups as well as the local media could be utilized to 
strenghten community solidarity as ,.,ell as provide info~.ation regarding 
various counseling and social service organizations -which could provide 
either psychological or economic support. 
Local government as '•Tell as public and private health service 
agencies--in conjunction with private medical practitioners--could insti-
tute "awareness" programs for those individuals who begin to manifest 
the behavioral or psychological traits which economic stress might induce, 
e.g., depression, increased drinking, increased physical and psychosomatic 
disorders, etc. In the same manner, communit;.' sponsored discussion groups 
could i1elp to explain the various interpersonal and domestic problems 
which might arise as a result of changes in econonic conditions. 
In the private economic sector, businesses and unions can t·.'ork 
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together to alleviate the trauma of economic change or job loss. For 
example, businesses can institute job-skill training programs for 
em?loyees whom they anticipate laying off or firing. Concomitantly, 
company personnel offices could serve as job-placement clearing ~ouses in 
an attempt to provide jobs for those ·employees who would need ti1em. 
Hany corporations have instituted such prograMs with substantial success. 
In addition to this, both the federal governr:tent and private corporations 
can, through local banks, offer low-interest loans to \·lOrkers who are 
unemployed allo1·:ing them to maintain an adequate lifestyle until new job 
opportunities arrive. 
Unions can function to help ameliorate the stresses of possible 
income loss and unemployment by minimizin<J the economic and job expecta-
tions of their members. 1!any unions have already instituted suci1 r::-o-:;rarns 
especially in conjunction with corporations who are facing dire economic 
conditions with negative implications for the union me:mbers 'dOrking there. 
We have been emphasizing local corranunity "action" programs as 
opposed to national social policy programs for various reasons. First, 
homicide and suicide are highly personal acts which theoretically may be 
related to feelings of frustration and relative deprivation vis-a-vis 
others in an individual's O\vn community as opposed to the nation as a 
whole. Secondly, economic conditions vary from one community to another. 
Thus, while one community may suffer economic deprivation due to its 
particular economic base, another community may be experiencing fewer 
economic problems or even prosperity. In such a situation, basic com-
munity problems will differ. It is our opinion that national policy may 
aid local commlli>ity efforts through (1) economic aid to local communities 
for such "action" programs, (2) providing federal authorities who might 
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help in initiating and running such local community ~rograns and (3) 
providing funds for further research into further honicide and suicide 
prevention programs. ~1ile these programs will never totally elininate 
homicide and suicide in our society, it is ho~ed that they ~·!ill at 
least minimize the human cost of radical change. 
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TABLE 1 
RELATIONSHIPS FOUND BETWEEN ECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS AND CRIME BY STUDY 
Homicide and 
Economic 
Conditions 
Negative 
Ne~ative 
Inconclusive 
Negative 
Positive 
Positive 
Negative 
Inconclusive 
Positive 
. . . 
Negative 
Property Crimes 
and Economic 
Conditions 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Positive 
Negative 
Negative· 
Positive 
Negative 
Inconclusive 
Negative 
. . . 
Negative 
Assault and 
Economic 
Conditions 
Negative 
Inconclusive 
Inconclusive 
Negative 
Positive 
Negative 
Positive 
Negative 
Inconclusive 
Positive 
. . . 
Negative 
Delinquency 
and Economic 
Conditions 
. . . 
. . . 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Suicides 
Total 
Hales 
Females 
Whites 
White 
!-tales 
White 
Females 
Blacks 
Black 
Hales 
Black 
Females 
Total 
Males 
Females 
Whites 
White 
Males 
White 
Females 
Blacks 
Bf!ia!k 
• a es 
·Black 
Females 
* 
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TABLE 2 
SUICIDES AND HOMICIDES 
1920-1941 
Industrial,;. 
Hanufacturing 
Production Unemployment 
-.68 (46) .56 (02) 
-.70 (50) .62 (02) 
-.23 (OS) -.02 (24) 
-.68 (47) .57 (01) 
-.71 (51) .62 (02) 
-.17 (03) -.OS (20) 
-.53 (28) .48 (01) 
-.54 (29) .49 (01) 
-.49 (24) .28 (11) 
Homicides 
-.31 (10) .38 (03) 
-.38 (14) .42 (02) 
-.29 (08) .40 (09), 
-.so (25) .sa (03) 
-.55 (30) .61 (02) 
-.29 (09) .39 (01) 
-.005 (01) .01 (004) 
-.03 (001) .03 (003) 
-.02 (003) .04 (007) 
( ) Variance explained. 
Consumer Amount of 
Price Variance 
Index Explained* 
-.54 (08) .56 
-.56 (09) .61 
-.32 (09) .38 
-.56 (09) .57 
-.ss (08) .59 
-.30 (09) .32 
-.39 (03) .32 
-.45 (06) .36 
-.05 (01) .36 
-.52 (18) .31 
-.56 (20) .36 
-.37 (06) .23 
-.53 (12) .40 
-.56 (14) .46 v 
-.21 (004) .10 
-.25 (06) .07 
-.24 (06) .06 
-.17 (03) .04 
Total 
Males 
Females 
Whites 
White 
Males 
~ite emales 
Blacks 
Black 
Males 
Black 
Females 
Total 
I-iales 
Females 
Whites 
White 
Males 
~ofuite 
Females 
Blacks 
Black 
Males 
Black 
Females 
* 
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TABLE 3 
SUICIDES AND HOHICIDES 
1920-1929 
Industrial-
Manufacturing 
- Production Unemployment 
Suicides 
-.62 (39) .47 (005) 
-.73 (54) .59 (000) 
.38 (14) -.49 (07) 
-.63_ (39) .47 (004) 
-.73 (53) . . . 
.42 (17) -.49 (03) 
-.83 (68) .68 (OS) 
-.78 (60) .66 (001) 
-.64 (141) .51 (10) 
Homicides 
-.68 (47) .52 (022) 
-.61 (37) .45 (01) 
-.76 (58) .65 (04) 
-.82 (67) .73 (02) 
-.76 (59) .68 (03) 
-.77 (60) .70 (04) 
.07 (005) -.25 (35) 
.13 (02) -.31 (33) 
-.40 (16) .23 (22) 
( ) Variance explained. 
Consumer Amount of 
Price Variance 
Index Explained* 
-.74 (37) .76 
-.72 (32) .86 
-.45 (30) .51 
-.76 (41) .so 
-.73 (32) .as 
-.39 (25) .45 
-.55 (14) .87 
-.65 (23) .83 
-.12 (10) .61 
-.71 (33) .so 
-.73 (37) .75 
-.45 (08) • 70 
,58 (17) .86 
-.60 (19) .81 
-.30 (003) .64 
-.29 (008) .36 
-.16 (01) .36 
-.29 (02) .40 
TABLE 4 
SUICIDES AND HOMICIDES 
1930-1941 
Suicides Industrial- Unemployment Consumer Personal Personal Amount of 
Manufacturing Price Savings Income Variance 
Production Index Explained* 
Total -.74 (55) .6J (01) -.58 (02) -.63 (10) .69 
Hales -.75 (57) .67 (OOJ) . . . -~57. (OJ) -.66 (08) .69 
Females -.52 (27) .32 (11) -.17 (001) -.52 (12) -.J9 (OS) .56 
\-lhites -.75 (57) .65 (007) -.59 (02) -.66 (11) • 70 
White Males -.76 (59) .68 (004) . . . -.57 (03) -.66 (08) .71 
White Females -.48 (23) .29 (08) -.20 (01) -.49 (18) -.38 (09) .60 
Blacks -.48 (23) .37 (01) -.18 (04) -.40 (01) - .• 37 (01) .31 1-' Black Males -.so (25) .42 (02) -.23 (02 . . . .30 0 
--.1 
Blac.l<. Females -.47 (22) .15 (34) -.007 (OS) -.52 (02) -.23 (OS) .71 
----------------------------------------------------
Homicides 
Total -.22 (OS) .35 (21) -.46 (04) -.16 (03) -.40 (19) .52 
Males -.33 (11) .45 (11) -.ss (19) -.23 (02) -.48 (14) .57 
Females -.12 (01) .30 (06) -.43 (01) -.07 (03) -.33 (24) .36 
Whites -.45 (21) .55 (23) -.55 (02) 
- •. 28 (09) -.56 (12) .67 
White Males -.54 (29) .63 (10) -.59 (02) -.33 (03) -.62 (24) .70 
White Females -.12 (01) .18 (10) -.12 (02) .OJ (08) -.16 (03) .25 
Blacks -.03 (001) .17 (12) -.41 (28) -.06 (09) -.23 (04) .54 
Black Males -.07 (006) .20 (10) -.43 (26) -.09 (09) -.27 (06) .53 
Black Females .11 (01) -.04 (09) -.14 (09) -.02 (003) .19 
* ( ) Variance explained. 
Suicides Industrial-
Manufacturing 
Production 
Total -.21 (04) 
Males -.26 {07) 
Females .05 (002) 
Whites -.23 (OS) 
White Males -.30 (09) 
White Females -.12 (01) 
Blacks -.17 (03) 
Black Males -.06 (004) 
Black Females -.25 (06) 
TABLE 5 
SUICIDES AND HOMICIDES 
1947-1974 
Unemployment Consumer 
Price 
Index 
.47 (23) -.02 (04) 
.60 (37) .08 (01) 
.06 (01) -.21 (04) 
.48 (22) -.01 {05) 
.63 (38) .07 {008) 
.15 (003) -.12 (11) 
.42 (20) .0.7 (005) 
.29 (14) • . . 
.18 (006) -.13 (02) 
Personal Personal Amount of 
Savings Income Variance 
Explained* 
-.12 (04) .12 (02) .47 
-.17 (04) .17 (04) .55 
-.15 (06) -.20 (04) .23 
-.14 (03) .11 (02) .39 
-.11 (02) .13 (03) .54 
-.15 (02) .02 (02 ( .-18 
-.33 (08) .09 (07) .40 
-.36 (10) .13 (09) .34 
. • . -.08 (03) .13 
-----------------------------------------------------Homicides 
Total .01 (OS) .o8 (001) .26 (15) .39 (002) .62 (39) .60 
t-1ales .oa (007) -.o8 (02) .31 (04) .18 (02) .sa (34) .44 
Females .13 (01) -.01 (02) .27 (001) .75 (63) .55 (05) .73 
Whites .15 (02) -.09 (006) .43 (03) .59 (08) .77 (58) .73 
White Males -.005 (01) .44 (OS) .41 (000) • 73 (59) .66 
White Females .17 (03) .04 (12) .26 (02) .74 (54) .52 (002) .71 
Blacks .15 (02) -.20 (OS) .16 (03) .16 (008) .41 (14) .27 
Black Males .14 (01) -.20 (04) .16 (OS) .06 (03) .37 (12) .27 
Black Females .17 (03) -.15 {001) .14 (01) .52 (27) .39 (02) .34 
* ( ) Variance explained. 
...... 
0 
ru 
sucides 
White Males 
Wldte Females 
Black Males 
Black Females 
Homicides 
Nhite Males 
White Females 
Black Hales 
Black Females 
*1920-1941 
TABLE 6 
SUHNARY OF PLOT (1-16} VARIABLE RELATIONSHIPS* 
Industrial-Manufacturing 
Production 
Negative(-. 7l) 
Random (-.17) 
NeCJative (-.54) 
Negative (- •. 49 ) 
Negative (-155) 
"1. ht Neij~tl.ve (-.19) 
Random (-. 0 3 ) 
Random (-.02) 
Unemployment 
Positive (. 62 ) 
Random (-.05) 
Positive(. 49 ) 
Slight 
Positive(.18) 
Positive (.61) 
S1' ht Po~1tl.ve (.39) 
Random (. 03) 
Random (. 04) 
TABLE 7 
SUMHARY OF PLOT (17-32) VARIABLE REL.I\TIONSIIIPS* 
Industrial-Manufacturing Unemployment** 
Production 
Suicides 
Hhite Males Negative(-. 30) Positive (. 63 ) 
~>Jhite Females Slight Slight 
Nel]ative(-.12) Positive ( .15) 
Black Hales Random (-.06) Slight 
Positive (. 29) 
Black Females 
slic;ht slirrht 
f--' Nogative(-.25) Positive (.18) f--' 
0 
Homicides 
White Males Random (. 000) Random (- • 005) 
vlhite Females Random (. 17) Random (-.04) 
Black Males Random ( .14) Slight 
negative(-.20) 
Black Females Slic;ht Slight 
Negative(.l7) Negative (-.15) 
*l94U-1974 
**Unemployment Rates are based on specific racial-sexual aggregate groupings. 
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INDUSTRIAL - MANUF' ACTURING PRODUCTIO~ 
WITH WHITE FEMALE HOMICIDES 
(1349- 1974) 
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CHANGES IN UNEMPLO\'MENT RATES 
WITH WHITE FEMALE HOMICIDES 
(1949 - 1974) 
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INDUSTRIAL - MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
WITH BLACK MALE HOMICIDES 
(1949- 1974) 
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CHANGES IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
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INDUSTRIAL - MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
W1TH BLACK FEMALE HOMICIDES 
(1949- 1974) 
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CHANGES IN UNEMPLO't"MENT RATES 
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(1949 - 1974) 
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INDUSTRIAL - MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
WITH WHITE MALE SUICIDES 
(1949 - 1974) 
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CHANGES IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
WITH WHITE MALE SUICIDES 
(19.19- 1974) 
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INDUSTRIAL - MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
WITH WHITE FEMALE SUICIDES 
(1949- !974) 
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CHANGES IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
WJTH WHITE FEMALE SUfCillES 
(1949- 1974) 
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INDUSTRIAL - MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
WITH BLACK MALE SUICIDES 
(1949 - 1974) 
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CHANGES IN UNEMPLOiNIENT RATES 
WITH BLACK MALE SUICIDES 
(1949 - 1974) 
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